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In the past Accelerated Vehicle Retirement (AVR) programs have been 
implemented to combat the economic and environmental costs of automobile 
dependent societies. Seventy-five such programs have been implemented 
worldwide since 1990. This thesis examines correlations among factors affecting 
program performance, the relationship of articulated program objectives to 
program performance, and how factors affecting program performance 
influence environmental concerns. Employing a mixed methodology, this 
analysis answers how an accelerated vehicle retirement program can be 
designed to maximize desired outcomes and minimize undesirable outcomes. 
The results of this analysis demonstrate that the order and type of objective 
stipulated by a program will influence a program’s performance, and that 
relationships among factors affecting program performance can dictate how 
well a program will function. The framework created from the literature review 
and from program analysis can apprise planners on how to most effectively 
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Despite the economic and ecological costs of motoring, people in developed 
nations continue to hold private vehicles as their primary tool for mobility. 
Planners and policymakers alike must develop systems to cope with the 
peripheral consequences of an auto-dependent society. Consequences include 
national security concerns stemming from increased dependence on foreign oil 
suppliers, and detriments to air quality as a result of vehicle emissions.  If 
people must commute via automobile, what policy implementations can reduce 
the economic and environmental costs of automobile operation?  
 
One proposed solution for correcting ills generated from an auto-dependent 
society is accelerated vehicle retirement (AVR). In the past, AVR programs have 
been introduced as mechanisms to remedy a number of economic and 
environmental dilemmas instigated by a disproportionate amount of older 
vehicles utilized in a particular locale. AVR programs have been conducted both 
domestically and internationally at various scales. Set off in 1990, roughly fifty 
AVR programs have been introduced in the past twenty years. The U.S. federal 
government executed the most recent AVR program in July and August of 2009. 
The Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS), or “Cash for Clunkers,” 
program offered consumers a monetary reward ($3,500 or $4,500) for trading in 
an older vehicle for a more fuel-efficient new vehicle. The CARS program 
dictated two broad objectives: to aid in an already expansive economic 
recovery effort by providing monetary stimulus through the increased sale of 
new automobiles, and to ameliorate past environmental harms caused by older 
gas-guzzling vehicles via the substitution of new fuel-efficient models. The 
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debate concerning the degree to which either objective was accomplished 
persists.  
 
While, vehicle retirement programs present an attractive method for 
expeditiously modifying entire vehicle fleets, objectives vary across various 
vehicle retirement programs, as do notions concerning the most optimal 
approach for execution. AVR implementation has occurred at various national 
and urban scales; the motivations behind such programs vary significantly. 
Design of AVR programs has not been methodical, and thus evaluation of such 
programs is neither objective nor able to account for diverse outcomes resulting 
from an AVR program’s implementation. As evaluation is an essential part of 
government planning, given the lack of an accepted framework for designing an 
AVR program, this research has considered how various AVR objectives might 
be characterized to aid in the creation of a framework and performance-
monitoring program for evaluating future AVR programs.  
 
The objectives of this research are to create a framework for designing an 
advanced vehicle retirement program according to varying scales and 
objectives and to develop a performance-monitoring program that accounts for 
both intended and undesirable consequences of an AVR program.  To realize 
the objectives, a literature review has been conducted that examines 




REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A review of the literature was conducted on the motivations, theories, and 
structure of past Accelerated Vehicle Retirement (AVR) programs. The literature 
review examines acknowledged economic and environmental aspects of AVR 
programs, and details past occurrences of AVR. Scrutinizing past motivations 
and program structures allows for the formation of an AVR knowledge base and 
permits for more accurate analysis.  
 
Motivations 
Older vehicles are disproportionately responsible for the bulk of vehicle 
emissions, and contribute excessively to air pollution in urban areas (Dill 2004 
22, EPA 1993 Section III, Hahn 1995 223, U.S. OTA 1992 1, Shaheen et. al. 1994 
220). Natural vehicle attrition rates, coalesced with improved vehicle 
technology, regulatory standards for vehicle emissions, and increased vehicle 
replacement as a result of heightened sales during sustained periods of 
economic stability correct the emissions consequence for a great number of 
vehicles. The effects of these combined factors are not immediate; vehicle fleet 
turnover is a gradual progression (ECMT 1999 3) Accelerated Vehicle 
Retirement (AVR,) alternatively identified as vehicle scrappage, cash-for-
clunkers, or fleet renewal can be a catalyst for hastening the total vehicle fleet 
turnover rate. A number of national and state governments, as well as private 





Policymakers employ incentive-based AVR programs for the purpose of 
achieving various social, economic, and environmental targets, of which there 
are often multiple goals (Mapako, 2010, 1).  AVR program objectives might 
include:  
1. the stimulation of a national economy through new car sales 
2. the reduction of vehicular emissions  
3. the improvement of vehicle safety 
4. the prevention of vehicle abandonment, or 
5. the curtailing of consumer spending on gasoline (Allen et al. 2009 1, 
ECMT 1999 7, Mapako 2010 1). 
 
A total vehicle fleet fuel consumption reduction might also result when an AVR 
program spawns the sale of new fuel-efficient vehicles (Evans 2008 66). 
Accordingly, rationale for AVR program implementation can be motivated by 




The allure of AVR as a medium to achieve environmental resolutions has 
sustained as vehicle scrappage presents an economical strategy for the 
removal of older vehicles not outfitted to cope with pollutant control measures 
stipulated by increasingly stringent mobile emissions and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. As older vehicles often lack technologically 
advanced emissions control systems, or faulty emissions control systems due to 
mechanical failure, vehicle fleet renewal can decrease the amount of older 
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vehicles in operation and “substantially curb atmospheric pollution” (ECMT 199 
27). Mobile emissions standards strive to rein in pollution criterions that originate 
from a vehicle’s direct tailpipe emissions, as well as mechanical deterioration of 
vehicle components. Dominant vehicle emissions contain carbon monoxide, 
hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, lead and particulate matter (AMS 1999). A 
succession of United States federal policies has endeavored to regulate mobile 
emissions, and lead to a federal stance toward AVR in 1993. 
 
California 
Regulatory actions in the state of California have preceded federal policy on a 
number of occasions, and often-pilot federal behavior. In 1959, California’s State 
Department of Public Health was tasked state statute to establish air quality 
standards as well as motor vehicle emissions controls (Hanemann 2008 121). 
The air quality standards were the first of their kind enacted in the United States. 













Table 1: Early Cali fornia Emissions Control Actions 
Year Action 
1960 Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board created to test, certify, distribute and install emissions control devices on vehicles sold in California. 
1961 
State Department of Public Health introduced the nation’s first emissions 
controls, ordering positive crankcase ventilation on new vehicles sold in 
California beginning in 1963 
1964 Motor Vehicle Control Board set tailpipe emissions standards for both hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide beginning in 1966 
1966 California Highway Patrol began random inspections of vehicle smog control devices. 
1967 
California Air Resources Board (CARB) was created, to “To promote and 
protect public health, welfare and ecological resources through the 
effective and efficient reduction of air pollutants while recognizing and 
considering the effects on the economy of the state” (CARB 2009). 
(Hanemann 2008 121) 
 
Precedents set by early California regulatory actions have allowed the state to 
recurrently formulate emissions control legislation in advance of the federal 
government. Consequently, the nation’s first AVR program, the Southern 
California Retired Automobile Program (SCRAP) was conducted by UNOCAL in 
the Los Angeles Air Basin in 1990 (Shaheen et. al. 1994 220). 
 
The Air Pollution Control Act of 1955 
Attempts to regulate air pollution by U.S. cities date back to the early 19th 
century. Air quality regulations were passed in 1815 by the city of Pittsburgh, 
and subsequently smoke control ordinances were ratified by both Cincinnati 
and Chicago (West 2005). Twenty-three U.S. cities approved air quality laws 
concerning smoke control by 1912 (West 2005). Following almost 150 years of 
allowing both state and local governments to enact often-divergent air quality 
regulations, the U.S. Congress passed the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955 to 
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manage air pollution on a national scale (AMS 1999). The Air Pollution Control 
Act did little more than publicize the fact that air quality was a nationalized 
concern, and provided research funding to that end. Amended twice, in both 
1960 and 1962, the 1962 amendments instructed the U.S. Surgeon General to 
“determine the health effects of various motor vehicle exhaust substances” 
(AMS 1999).  
 
The Clean Air Act of 1963 
The Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1963 substantially increased funding to state and 
local governments intended for air quality research and the formation of air 
pollution control measures. Centered on research of motor vehicle emissions 
instructed by the Air Pollution and Control Act Amendments of 1962, the CAA of 
1963 advanced the idea that emissions standards could be advantageous for 
motor vehicles (AMS 1999).  The Clean Air Act of 1963 was amended each year 
1965-1967, as well as 1969. The 1965 amendments, dubbed the “Motor Vehicle 
Pollution Control Act,” required the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare to develop emissions standards for new vehicles – 6 years after 
California lawmakers had instructed the state’s Department of Public Health to 
do the same (AMS 1999, Hanemann 2008 121). The 1965 amendments were 
created, in part, to prevent further action at the state level to control vehicle 
emissions. Following California’s lead, several states had begun to propose 
vehicle emissions standards. Rather than face a system of multi-tiered 
distribution and a logistical nightmare, automakers rallied in support of a 
national emissions regulation (Gerard & Lave 2005 766). For that reason, the 
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1969 CAA broadened research funding for further research on automobile 
emissions as well as low emissions fuels (AMS 1999). 
 
The Clean Air Act of 1970 
Officially designated as an amendment, the CAA of 1970 was an entirely 
reshaped version of the 1963 CAA (AMS 1999). Coinciding with the creation of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, the CAA of 1970 fashioned 
mobile source emission standards for automobiles and light trucks 
(Ruckelshaus 2009). Drafted by Maine democratic Senator Edmund Muskie, the 
amendments proposed more stringent vehicle emissions standards, “consistent 
with current technology and economic feasibility” (Gerard & Lave 2005 766). 
Measured against 1970 emission levels, the standards required a 90 percent 
reduction in carbon monoxide and emissions by 1975 and an additional 90 
percent reduction in nitrogen oxide by 1976 (Rosenbaum 2010; Gerard & Lave 
2005 766). The EPA was required to establish a Federal Testing Procedure 
(FTP) against which vehicle emissions would be estimated in order to obtain a 
federal certification, additionally the FTP provided a foundation on which the 
required 90 percent reductions would be based (Gerard & Lave 2005 767). 
Each vehicle sold that failed to obtain federal certification warranted a $10,000 
penalty, to be paid by that vehicle’s manufacturer. The average new vehicle 
cost in 1975 was in the order of $5,000 (Gerard & Lave 2005 767). Following a 
series of delays and court battles surrounding EPA testing procedures and 
catalytic converters, the CAA amendments of 1977 extended the deadline to 
meet motor vehicle emissions standards. As the emissions standards outlined in 
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the 1970 CAA were quite ambitious, the 1977 CAA amendments designated an 
additional period of time for compliance (AMS 1999). 
 
Catalytic Converters 
The catalytic converter accepts vehicle exhaust in advance of it leaving a 
vehicle’s tailpipe. Structurally the most vital part of a vehicle’s emissions control 
system, the catalytic converter aims to reduce harmful emissions released from 
a vehicle’s engine (Sokol & Harmacy 14).  Domestic auto manufacturers faced a 
host of tribulations in route to attaining the 90 percent emissions reduction 
required by the CAA of 1970, resulting in more than a few delays (Gerard & 
Lave 2005 768). Technology considered necessary to reach the CAA mandated 
reductions was not yet widely available in 1970, and significant costs faced auto 
manufacturers who were required to meet them. The EPA maintained that 
catalytic converters could be used to meet emissions standards, though they 
were not yet widely obtainable. As well, the U.S. fleet in the early 1970s was 
largely comprised of vehicles that operated on leaded gasoline. Leaded 
gasoline tended to ruin catalytic converters by depositing lead inside the 
converter housing (Gerard and Lave 2005 767).  A sequence of court battles 
between the EPA and domestic auto manufacturers (see Table 2) resulted in the 
delay of the 90 percent emissions reduction date by one year (Gerard & Lave 
767-768). In spite of this, domestic automobile manufacturers, without viable 
alternatives, began to employ catalytic converters in mass. Catalytic converter 
market dissemination, combined with the 1973-1974 oil embargo, resulted in 
leaded gasoline’s virtual removal from the U.S. fuel supply in the late 1970s. 
After 1980, all vehicles produced for the U.S. market are required to be 
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equipped with catalytic converter technology (Sokol & Harmacy 14). For the 
reason that a catalytic converters have a tendency to breakdown with age and 
use, the oldest vehicles in a vehicle fleet discharge more pollution into the 
atmosphere than do newer vehicles. 
 
Table 2: Clean Air Act of 1970 Implementation Timeline 
Date Action 
December 21, 1970  Clean Air Act Amendments direct EPA to set standards and federal Test procedure 
June 23, 1971 EPA sets standards for 1975 model year 
January 1, 1972 
National Academy of Science issues report 
suggesting technology to meet standard is not yet 
available 
March 13, 1972 Volvo requests delay of standards. Other automakers follow suit, including Ford, GM, and Dodge on April 5 
March 12, 1972 EPA denies extension 
December 18-19, 1972 
D.C Court of Appeals hears automakers appeal and 
remands case back to EPA for further investigation 
(International Harvester V Ruckelshaus) 
December 30, 1972 EPA issues supplement to Decision of the Administrator 
February, 1973 D.C Court of Appeals again remands (International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus) 
April, 1973 EPA delays HC, CO standards 
June, 1973 EPA delays NOx standards 
June, 1974 Congress extends interim HC, CO standards to 1977 and NOx to 1978 
February, March 1975 EPA extends interim HC, CO standards to 1977 and NOx to 1978 
August, 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments push interim HC to 1980 and CO, NOx standards to 1981 
(Gerard & Lave 2005 769) 
 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
A decade after the CAA amendments of 1977, the California state legislature 
passed the California Clean Air Act (CCAA) of 1988. As air quality in California 
continued to deteriorate in the ten years since the federal CAA amendments of 
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1977 had passed, due to population growth that resulted in more vehicles on 
California roadways, legislators sought to cope with air quality problems through 
stricter air quality standards. The CCAA set forth numerous provisions including: 
the full elimination of leaded gasoline, enhanced catalytic converter 
requirements, gasoline-vapor recovery procedures, inspection and maintenance 
(I/M) programs for vehicles, advanced fuel-injection systems for passenger 
cars, mandated new emissions standards, and reformulated gasoline (Van Vorst 
& George 1997 34). 
 
Heavily based on the CCAA of 1988, the CAA amendments of 1990 
promulgated the use of gasoline-vapor recovery procedures, reformulated 
gasoline, and set more stringent emissions standards (McCarthy 2005 8-9). 
Passenger vehicles were required to meet a 40 percent emissions reduction in 
hydrocarbons, as well as a 50 percent emissions reduction in nitrogen oxide 
(McCarthy 2005 8). Provision was made for a second set of reductions 
beginning in year 2004, based on an evaluation of need. In 1998, the EPA 
reported to Congress that further emissions reductions were both desirable and 
attainable (McCarthy 2005 8). For the first time, Congress subjected minivans, 
SUVs, and light trucks to passenger car emissions standards in 2004 (EPA 
2008, McCarthy 2005).  
 
The CAA amendments of 1990 required the EPA to set National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) to address pollutants harmful to both humans and 
the environment (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). Areas that exceed 
the ambient air quality standard on four different dates over the duration of a 
three-year period are considered to be in “non-attainment” (Merrifield, 1998). 
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The EPA provides an updated list of non-attainment areas. Consequences for an 
area that falls into non-attainment include the loss of Federal transportation 
funds, the prohibition of major building projects, and general detrimental health 
effects for residents of that area (Environmental Protection Agency, 2008).  
 
Additionally, the CAA amendments of 1990 mandated that metropolitan 
planning organizations (MPO) and air quality management districts (AQMD) 
secure consistency between air quality management plans and new 
transportation projects (Simon 1993 1). Titles I and IV of the CAA amendments 
of 1990 established a market-based emissions trading system for attaining 
NAAQS (Wooley and Morss 2000 13). Effectively launching the idea of cap and 
trade with regard to pollution control, polluters could purchase pollution credits 
from other entities, or reduce emissions in another area of their AQMD, if the 
total emissions reduction remedied their own emissions discharge (Washington 
1993 1). The reductions could be attained from other CAA designated sectors. 
One tactic was to examine the more straightforward reductions available from 
mobile emissions standards (Washington 1993 1). Thus, AVR programs 
represented a cost-effective means for attaining mobile source emissions 
reduction credits (MSERC). UNOCAL’s SCRAP program in 1990 provided the 
UNOCAL Corporation with emissions reduction credits as “the difference in 
emissions between retired and replacement vehicle” was claimed as an 
emissions reduction (Simon 1993 1). Table 3 provides a lineage of the Clean Air 





Table 3: Clean Air Act Descriptions 
Date Name Description 
1955 Air Pollution and Control Act 
An Act to provide research and technical 
assistance relating to air pollution control 
1960 
Air Pollution and 
Control Act 
amendment 
Extended research funding for four more years 
1962 
Air Pollution and 
Control Act 
amendment 
Instructed U.S. Surgeon General to determine the 
health effects of various motor vehicle exhaust 
1963 Clean Air Act 
An Act to improve, strengthen, and accelerate 
programs for the prevention and abatement of air 
pollution 
1965 Clean Air Act amendment Expanded local air pollution control programs 
1966 Clean Air Act amendment 
Divided the nation into Air Quality Control Regions 
(AQCRs) to monitoring ambient air quality and set 
a timetable for State Implementation Plans (SIPs) 
1967 
Clean Air Act 
amendment: Air 
Quality Act 
Extended authorization for research on low 
emissions fuels and automobiles. 
1970 Clean Air Act amendments 
An Act to amend the Clean Air Act to provide for a 
more effective program to improve the quality of 
the Nation's air. 
1977 Clean Air Act amendments 
Extended deadline to meet Motor Vehicle Emission 
Standards 
1990 Clean Air Act amendments 
An Act to amend the Clean Air Act to provide for 
attainment and maintenance of health protective 





Prior to an exploration of EPA vehicle retirement implementation documents, it is 
prudent to look at the convoluted ways in which Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy standards (CAFE) work in concert with the Clean Air Act. CAFE 
standards, which sought to reduce energy consumption by increasing the fuel 
economy of cars and light trucks (NHTSA, 2010) were endorsed in the Energy 
Policy Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975 as a federal response to the 1973-1974 
oil embargo (Morrow, et. al, 2010, 1307; Goldberg, 1998, 1; NHTSA, 2010). 
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Novel at the time of enactment, the controversial CAFE standards required 
automobile manufacturers, who wished to market vehicles in the U.S., to attain a 
minimum sales weighted average fuel efficiency standard of 27.5 mpg by 1985, 
doubling new vehicle fuel economy (Goldberg, 1998, 1; NHTSA, 2010).  Fears 
concerning both energy security and impending climate change have prompted 
a renewed focus on reduced fuel consumption and emissions in the U.S. over 
the last decade (Evans, 2008, 3). The Energy Independence and Security Act 
(EISA) of 2007 altered CAFE standards by establishing a target of 35 miles per 
gallon for both cars and light trucks by model year 2020 (Sissine, 2007, 1). EISA 
required a 92 percent compliance rate for all passenger cars and light trucks 
during a given model year, yet allows vehicle manufacturers to secure credits 
for vehicle classes that exceed the revised standards in order to make up for 
another vehicle class not in line with CAFE targets (Sissine, 2007, 4). In an effort 
to address CO2 emissions, the Obama administration set a goal of achieving a 
CAFE standard of 35.5 mpg by 2016 (Morrow et al., 2007, 1306). Canada’s fuel 
consumption program established similar targets, however the program is 
voluntary (EIA, 2010, 112; Transport Canada, 2010). CAFE standards in 
conjunction with CAA amendments help regions thwart the possibility of falling 
into air quality non-attainment. Vehicles that consume less fuel have more 
efficient engines, and thus produce fewer emissions. 
 
Massachusetts v. EPA 
A point of contention surrounding the Air Quality Act of 1967 was whether states 
like California, who had previously imposed their own air quality emissions 
standards, would be allowed to continue to exceed government set emissions 
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standards (Hanemann 2005 122). Auto manufacturers preferred a national 
emissions standards benchmark, rather than a variety of state formulated 
emissions yardsticks. As California’s emissions standards were more stringent 
than national emissions standards, auto manufacturer arguments were 
particularly strident. In the end, California alone was granted federal exemption 
to continue to set its own emissions criterion (Hanemann 2005 122). A pioneer 
with respect to air quality standards, Congress was inclined to indulge California 
in its quest for emissions standards innovation, as advances in air quality 
improvement in California might reap benefits nationally (Hanemann 2005 122).  
Between 1967 and 2000, California has been granted federal exemption no less 
than sixteen separate occasions (Hanemann 205 122).  
 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty that created legally binding 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions targets for industrialized nations (Rosenbaum 
2010 366).  President Bill Clinton signed the treaty in 1998, but failed to consent 
the U.S. Senate and was soon involved in impeachment proceedings. 
Unsurprisingly, the Senate rejected the treaty (Rosenbaum 2010 375, Saundry 
2005).  President George W. Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, 
opting instead to set domestic policy for voluntary GHG reductions (Saundry 
2005).  
 
In the absence of federal action, states began to adopt their own GHG 
emissions reduction targets (Rosenbaum 2010 376). The CAA of 1990 allows 
states the option to adhere to federal vehicle emissions standards or the more 
stringent California vehicle emissions standards (EDF 2008). Twelve states 
adopted California vehicle emissions standards after the CAA of 1990 including: 
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Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington (Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change). In 2006, the EPA contended that CO2 regulation was 
not warranted under the CAA, and resolved to deny California an exemption to 
enact more stringent vehicle emissions standards than the federal government 
on that basis (Rosenbaum 2010 377). California had historically been granted 
exemption, and as the CAA amendments allowed other states to adopt 
California vehicle emissions standards, the EPA opinion was challenged in 
federal court (Rosenbaum 2010 377). In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme 
Court of the United States was petitioned by 29 entities to ascertain whether or 
not the CAA warranted the EPA to regulate CO2.  Table 4 lists the entities 
















Table 4: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency part icipants 
Petit ioner Challenger 
California EPA 
Connecticut Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers 
Illinois National Automobile Dealers Association 
Maine Engine Manufacturers Association 
Massachusetts Truck Manufacturers Association 
New Jersey CO2 Litigation Group 
New Mexico Utility Air Regulatory Group 
New York Michigan 
Oregon Alaska 
Rhode Island Idaho 
Vermont Kansas 
Washington Nebraska 
New York City North Dakota 
Baltimore Ohio 
Washington D.C. South Dakota 
American Samoa Texas 
Center for Biological Diversity Utah 
Center for Food Safety (Meltz 2007 2) 
Conservation Law Foundation 
Environmental Advocates  
Environmental Defense  
Friends of the Earth  
Greenpeace  
International Center for 
Technology Assessment 
 
Nation Environmental Trust  
Natural Resources Defense 
Council 
 
Sierra Club  
Union of Concerned Scientist  
U.S. Public Interest Group  
 
By a 5-4 margin the court held, in its first decision on climate change, that the 
CAA gave the EPA authority to regulate CO2 as its potential affect on climate 
change may harm human health and the environment (Rosenbaum, 2010 377, 
Meltz 2007 1). 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision to in Massachusetts v. EPA is the latest step in 
federal environmental policy that impacts the regulation of motor vehicle 
 
 18 
emissions. A litany of CAA amendments has resolved to police emissions from 
motor vehicles in an attempt to elevate U.S. air quality. When CAA regulation 
combined with CAFE standards do not produce expected motor vehicle 
emissions improvements, one alternative is AVR.  
 
EPA Implementation 
The CAA amendments of 1990 touted AVR as one practical method for reducing 
emissions in an inventory of potential transportation emissions source control 
measures (EPA 1993 Section II). To that end, a 1993 EPA implementation 
document entitled “Guidance for the Implementation of Accelerated Retirement 
of Vehicles Programs” reiterated the commonly held conviction that the oldest 
vehicles in a fleet are responsible for an inordinate amount of vehicle emissions 
in a particular locale (Section III). Citing AVR programs as a “cost–effective 
alternative to more expensive and difficult stations source emission control 
measures,” EPA’s vehicle scrappage implementation document promoted “the 
voluntary removal from use and the marketplace of pre-1980 model light duty 
vehicles and pre-1980 light duty trucks” (EPA 1993 Section II). The U.S. Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA) encapsulates the ability of an AVR program to 
reduce vehicle emissions by affirming “retiring old vehicles will have a positive 
impact on vehicle emissions because the vehicles being retired were originally 
subject to emissions standards that were weaker than those required of new 
vehicles” (OTA 1992 3). Presupposing that natural attrition corrects the 
emissions consequence of a great number of vehicles, the EPA proposed 
vehicle scrappage programs as a way to cope with vehicles that continue to 
remain in operation for long periods of time (EPA, 1993, Section III). The eight 
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requirements for an AVR program, as detailed by the EPA, are common to a 
number of domestic and foreign AVR programs. Table 5 details EPA designed 
requirements for AVR:  
 
Table 5: Environmental Protection Agency Requirements for an AVR program 
Requirement Reason 
Twelve month registration 
To ensure that vehicles are not imported into an 
area for the sole purpose of being sold in the 
program, and that a vehicle owner did not 
purchase a vehicle for the sole purpose of selling 
that vehicle in an AVR program 
Vehicle must be operable 
and driven to site 
To target those vehicles most likely to continue to 
disperse harmful pollutants, and not those that 
have little remaining useful life 
Owner must be present and 
possess valid title 
To ensure that the legal owner of a vehicle 
intends to retire the vehicle, as accepted vehicles 
are dismantled and cannot be repaired 










To ensure that waste created during vehicle 
dismantling is handled properly, the EPA requires 
that vehicles be scrapped by licensed or 
approved facilities. 
Emissions estimates For the purposes of quantifying emissions reduction 
Minimum data gathering for 
programs over 2500 
vehicles 
Rather than collect substantial data from each 
vehicle, large programs are allowed to select a 
random sample in order to provide the EPA a 
resource for evaluating a program 
State responsibility  
To ensure states are in accordance with EPA 
guidelines for the purposes of estimating a fleet 
emissions reduction 




The eight requirements for conducting an AVR program, as detailed by the EPA, 
are concerned primarily with the beneficial environmental impacts an AVR 
program can produce, but allow for economic benefits by permitting states to 
award Mobile Source Emissions Reduction Credits (MSERCs) when clunkers are 
scrapped (Merrified 1998 2).  
 
Environmental Accelerated Vehicle Retirement Theory 
In response to the promulgation of Accelerated Vehicle Retirement programs as 
instruments for rectifying environmental harms as a result of continued older 
vehicle utilization, a plethora of literature on AVR focuses on both the potential 
environmental benefits and surmised environmental detriments of vehicle 
scrappage. The literature does not concentrate solely on the environmental 
implications of an AVR scheme. Rather, as vehicles represent a purchasable 
good, research with an environmental focus, at times, muddles through 
economic speculation. Still, as any environmental strategy will ultimately face a 
balance sheet, the research is worthy of examination.  
 
The conclusion of several AVR programs led to an examination of the air quality 
impacts of vehicle scrappage in a 1994 issue of the Transportation Research 
Record. The analysis concluded air quality benefits attributable to AVR are, to a 
great extent, uncertain for reasons including: 
1. Vehicles retired in scrappage programs are likely to have been junked in 
the near future without the existence of an AVR program, and 
2. Retired vehicles may have sat idle, and thus produced no air quality 
impacts (Hsu et al., 1994, 90). 
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The review contended that in order to gauge accurate emissions reductions as 
a result of an AVR program, a number of questions must be answered. Thus, the 
following analytical framework was provided as a solution: 
1. “How much earlier were the old automobiles retired than they otherwise 
would have been without the program? 
2. How much would the automobiles have been driven if they had not been 
retired? 
3. What were the emissions levels of the retired automobiles? 
4. How were the VMT of the retired automobiles replaced? 
5. How many VMT will occur on the replacement vehicle when there is one? 
6. What will be the emissions levels of the replacement automobiles?” (Hsu 
et al., 90). 
 
At the time the analytical framework was provided, scrappage programs were 
only recently beginning to become fervent policy topics. Consequently, cost-
benefit and air quality impact analysis was not yet attainable for AVR programs. 
The framework suggested that despite the lack of available information from 
completed AVR programs, scrutiny of AVR implementation was necessary (Hsu 
et al., 1994, 98).  
 
Examining proposed benefits and costs as a result of an AVR program, a 1995 
analysis of AVR considered the implications of a scrappage program in Los 
Angeles County, and attempted to establish a model for gauging the emissions 
reductions for future AVR programs (Hahn, 1995, 222). The model determined 
that a vehicle’s remaining lifetime was a crucial point of assessment in 
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“determining whether retiring that vehicle was economical” (Hahn, 1995, 236). 
However, moving from a purely economical evaluation of vehicle scrappage, the 
model determined implications for location based vehicle scrappage. Hahn’s 
research suggested that an AVR scheme would be most effective in polluted 
urban areas “where there is a high fraction of older vehicles and the marginal 
benefits from reducing pollution are high” (1995 239). The model then 
anticipated that vehicle scrappage strategies would be implemented on a 
temporary basis. From an emissions reduction standpoint, the study questioned 
the effectiveness of vehicle scrappage programs over a long duration by 
suggesting, “once the relatively dirty vehicles are removed from the fleet, the 
gains from scrappage are significantly diminished” (Hahn, 1995, 239). Concerns 
arise from problems with fraud, estimating the remaining lifetime of a vehicle, 
and accurately testing harmful vehicle emissions. Despite these concerns, the 
model concluded, “it is, indeed, possible to design scrappage programs that 
will achieve some cost-effective emission reductions in selected urban areas” 
(Hahn, 1995, 239). 
 
An AVR program that subsidizes vehicle scrappage in conjunction with an 
emissions tax that reflects deteriorating vehicle emissions systems over time 
was postulated in 1996 to be the most effectual strategy for designing an AVR 
scheme that would address the harmful environmental externalities created by 
personal vehicles (Innes, 1996, 236- 237). The proposed model was similar to 
current vehicle inspection and maintenance (I/M) programs, currently employed 
by numerous state governments. The model placed a higher tax on a vehicle’s 
emission system as the vehicle aged, and reversed the effect of the tax by 
offering higher scrappage subsidies for the newest vehicles in a fleet. As older 
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vehicles that are retired sooner than later, reflect, “greater emission reduction 
benefits because the car is off the road an additional year,” the AVR model 
proposed a higher reward for vehicles retired earliest (Innes, 1996, 237). Unlike 
Hahn’s model, the Innes’ model conjectures an AVR program that is continuous 
“rather than a one shot” so that the temptation is removed for drivers who might 
purposefully retain their vehicles solely for the purpose of later qualifying for 
proposed AVR programs (Innes, 1996, 237). 
 
A 1997 AVR analysis researched proposed AVR programs by employing the 
use of a new methodology entitled CALCARS, a vehicle choice-demand usage 
model for California used to simulate the response to large-scale AVR programs 
at the household level (Kavalec and Setiawan 1997 95). CALCARS introduced 
the ability to project the effect of an AVR on a host of new variables including:  
1. Vehicle ownership, 
2. Vehicle miles traveled (VMT,) 
3. Fuel use, 
4. Fuel efficiency, and 
5. Consumer welfare, (Kavalec and Setiawan, 1997, 95).  
 
With regard to vehicle emissions, the model conjectured that reducing the age 
of the vehicle fleet within a given area might benefit that area’s total average fuel 
economy. Conversely, they postulated that a “higher average miles per gallon 
(mpg) level and lower average vehicle age may mean more total VMT (Kavalec 




Kavalec and Setiawan examined the impacts of AVR programs that targeted 
vehicles both ten-plus and twenty-plus-years-old, and determined that an AVR 
program that concentrated on acquiring vehicles twenty years and older might 
“be a more cost effective way of reducing” pollution than a program that targets 
vehicles ten-years and older (Kavalec and Setiawan, 1997, 106). Various AVR 
programs commonly have requirements that vehicles be older than ten to 
twenty-five years of age, but not older than twenty-five years. The 2009 U.S. 
CARS program stipulated that vehicles must have been “manufactured less than 
25 years before the date of trade-in” (NHTSA, 2009, 6). Initially hypothesizing 
that an AVR program may adversely affect “low income households by 
significantly affecting the price of the lowest cost vehicles,” the research 
concluded that a 20-year-plus program might retard the effect of an AVR on 
used vehicles because the supply of low cost vehicles aged 10-plus-years 
would remain robust (Kavalec and Setiawan, 1997, 106). An extension of this 
research in 2004 found that vehicle subsidies during an AVR program increased 
the probability that owners of vehicles aged 10-plus-years would elect to scrap 
their vehicles by 20 percent (Yamamoto et al., 2004, 924). 
The prospective negative consequence of Accelerated Vehicle Retirement has 
led to four objections against the supposition that AVR programs are beneficial 
to the environment including: 
1. The focus of previous research on AVR programs has been concerned 
exclusively with vehicle use, and neglected other phases in a vehicle life-
cycle that require energy including production and demolition that 
stimulate emissions,  
2. AVR shortens in-use vehicle lifetimes and accelerates new vehicle 
production, thus escalating emissions, 
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3. Due to increased energy-efficiency replacement cars are likely to be 
driven more, “which leads to an increase in petrol consumption,” and 
4. The proclamation that a retrofitting strategy may be favorable to an AVR 
scheme, as vehicles that produce the highest amounts of pollution may 
be dealt with more cost-effectively. (Van Wee et al., 2000, 138-141).  
!
Analysis has concluded that AVR as an emissions reduction strategy is flawed 
because the actual result is an increase in “life-cycle energy use” and 
emissions, a trend that will continue unless yearly fuel efficiency improvements 
are greatly augmented (Van Wee et al., 2000, 143). Kim et al. determined that 
scrapping vehicles less than 20 years of age resulted in a small increase in of 
CO2 emissions, when accounting for vehicle production (Kim et al., 2004, 246). 
Spitzley et al. revealed that an optimal vehicle scrappage age of 10-14 years 
reduced the overall cost of pollutants, ownership costs notwithstanding (Spitzley 
et al., 2005, 173). 
 
The idea that a vehicle scrappage program will produce environmental benefits 
appears intuitive. Removing older vehicles with feeble emissions systems and 
replacing them with vehicles that house robust emission control systems 
inevitably decreases harmful tailpipe emissions, at face value. Various foreign 
and domestic AVR programs ostensibly interpret such ideas at face value, 
without accounting for increases in VMT or full life-cycle emissions.  As well, 
many domestic programs have made no conjectures as to what, if any, impact 
the programs would have in areas in danger of being in air quality non-
attainment. Even more curiously, some years after hybrid vehicles have become 
a rational and cost-effective choice for many consumers; many programs have 
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not placed an overt emphasis on the utilization of hybrid vehicles. Assumedly, 
had these vehicles been utilized, a greater share of vehicle emissions could 
have been reduced.  
 
Synopsis of Environmental Motivations for AVR 
Disproportionately responsible for the bulk of vehicle emissions, older vehicles 
contribute unjustifiably to air pollution in urban areas (Dill 2004 22, EPA 1993 
Section III, Hahn 1995 223, U.S. OTA 1992 1, Shaheen et. al. 1994 220). A 
reduction in older vehicles will reduce emissions, “since older cars not only 
produce higher emissions, but also fail to use new and environmentally friendlier 
technologies” (Baltas and Xepapadeas, 1999, 329). In order to rectify harms 
caused by vehicle emissions, progressively more stringent emissions controls 
have been enacted by the United States Congress and enforced by the U.S. 
EPA and NHTSA. As such emissions control measures are innately incapable of 
resolving emissions harms generated by older vehicles on international 
roadways, a “blunt instrument” is required to remedy the emissions damages 
generated by the oldest vehicles in a vehicle fleet (Hahn 1995 239). AVR can 
hasten the amount of time with which the oldest vehicles in a fleet are replaced, 
thus diminishing the emissions impact of a great number of older vehicles.  
 
Theories concerning the likelihood that an AVR program is capable of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions abound. It has been speculated that AVR can have 
an impact on air pollution in urban areas by removing the oldest vehicles in the 
operational vehicle fleet. Doubt concerning an AVR program’s ability to reduce 
vehicle emissions conjectures that, once an older vehicle has been replaced 
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with a new vehicle, the new vehicle will be driven more often. In lieu of such 
supposition, many foreign and domestic AVR programs continue to implement 
AVR with environmental motivations.  
 
Economic Motivations 
The attraction of Accelerated Vehicle Retirement as a medium to achieve 
economic stimulus is tied directly to environmental motivations for vehicle 
scrappage. When older vehicles are removed from the vehicle fleet for the 
purpose of reducing pollutant emissions, replacement vehicles are an 
anticipated acquisition. Historically, the economic benefits of vehicle scrappage 
were merely consequential. In recent years, AVR strategies have been imposed 
with the primary objective of reviving slumping automobile sales. Both foreign 
and domestic countries have instituted AVR programs to resuscitate distressed 
automobile manufacturers, which represent a sizeable portion of worldwide 
economies. The largest of such programs, the 2009 U.S. cars program, ensued 
a national economic recession. AVR programs can be implemented to stimulate 
vehicle sales by offering a cash incentive to participants. The magnitude of 
purchase incentives has varied according to location, and is often based on the 
discretion of national leadership.  
 
Economic Accelerated Vehicle Retirement Theory 
Much of the existing economic literature concerning vehicle scrappage explores 
the makeup of private economic evaluations regarding whether or not to scrap 
an older vehicle (Hahn, 1995, 223). Deriving primarily from the field of 
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economics, a preponderance of the literature attempts to model determinants of 
participation in an AVR program, and the resulting impact on the economy as a 
whole (Dill, 2001, 17; Chen and Lin, 2006, 733). Economic Theory of AVR 
centers on several criteria including: age, cost of repair, incentive amount. 
 
Age 
A vehicle’s utility inherently declines with age. As well, the notion that the 
decision to scrap a vehicle, once the cost to repair that vehicle is more than the 
vehicle’s market value is relatively straightforward. Accordingly, initial economic 
models of vehicle scrappage are consistently traced to an analysis that 
scrutinized vehicle scrappage rates in the U.S. from 1949 through 1967 (Hahn, 
1995, 223; Walker 1968, 503). The analysis yielded that vehicle scrappage 
would occur when an owner has concluded he/she cannot “profitably repair, 
recondition and resell” a vehicle (Walker, 1968, 503). Thus, the decision to 
scrap a vehicle was stated to be contingent upon four identifiable 
characteristics including:   
1. Age  
2. Condition  
3. Cost of repair or reconditioning, and 
4. Expected resale value (Walker 1968 503.)  
!
The likelihood that a vehicle will be scrapped was established to ascend with 
the age of that vehicle and level off at the most advanced vehicle ages.  The 
oldest vehicles in a fleet face an exceedingly decreased amount of operation. 
The stabilization of vehicle scrappage rates at advanced vehicle ages was due 
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in large part to a decrease in the odds that the oldest vehicles in a fleet were 
being intentionally preserved by their owners as classics (Walker, 1968, 505). 
 
The decision to scrap a vehicle was aligned to an additional set of cost criteria 
in 1977 that integrated: 
1. Vehicle purchase cost 
2. Maintenance and repair costs, and  
3. Cost of vehicle replacement (Parks, 1977, 1099).  
!
By means of regression analysis, the model demonstrated that vehicle repair 
costs implicitly rise with the age of a vehicle. As a result, older vehicles were 
concluded to comprise those vehicles most probably scrapped (Chen and Lin, 
2006, 734.) Individual vehicle owners would opt to repair their vehicles if the 
costs of doing so did “not exceed the difference between the value of a working 
vehicle and its scrap value” (Parks, 1977, 1100). Greenspan and Cohen later 
corroborated this notion in a 1996 analysis of vehicle scrappage (Greenspan 
and Cohen, 1996, 375). The decision to scrap a vehicle was analyzed in 2006 
by modeling vehicle survival rates at a government agency, the Dupage County, 
Illinois County Forest Preserve District (Chen & Lin, 2006, 732). It was 
determined that while vehicle age alone appears to increase the probability that 
a vehicle will be scrapped, other variables also contribute to the decision. 
Variables include vehicle make, vehicle type, and the number of repairs 
performed on a particular vehicle. 
 
An examination of data derived from the Israeli vehicle market in 1983 took the 
work of Parks (1977,) and applied it in a location-based context (Manski and 
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Goldin, 1983, 365 – 366). In the vein of the 1977 model, the new model 
assumed that a vehicle would be scrapped if that vehicle’s scrap value 
exceeded the current market value of the vehicle, minus any needed repair 
costs (Dill, 2001, 18). All other variables equal (mileage, condition, current 
market value,) the model determined that a vehicle’s scrappage probability 
would decrease as its price increased (Manski and Goldin, 1983, 372). Plainly, 
as older vehicles are often those least valued, they are most commonly those 
vehicles most likely to be scrapped. The examination determined that increases 
in the scrappage rates of vehicles aged between 3 and 14 years was “due 
much more to the depreciation of vehicle prices as vehicles age than to 
increases in failure-proneness” (Manski and Goldin, 1983, 375). 
 
Subsequent economic inquiry built on the assumptions of past models, 
specifically that vehicles will be repaired only if the cost to do so was less than 
the value of that vehicle in working condition (Berkovec, 1985, 198). Applying 
these models in the context of the automobile market as a whole, a 1985 
analysis determined that a progressively greater amount of owners will select to 
scrap their vehicles as compounded mechanical failures within a particular 
vehicle render the overall value of the vehicle near that of the vehicle’s scrapped 
value (Berkovec, 1985, 199). The inquiry went on to argue that the total U.S. 
vehicle fleet would grow throughout the 1980’s, not directly related to the sale of 
new vehicles, but owing to the combined effects of an increase in new vehicle 
price points and a decrease in the number of scrapped vehicles. The analysis 
predicted that despite the fact that outputs by vehicle manufacturers would 
decrease throughout the 1980s, additional numbers of aging vehicles would be 
utilized as a cost saving remedy (Berkovec, 1985, 213). The inquiry concluded 
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with the idea that a rise in the number of older vehicles within the U.S. vehicle 
fleet would have repercussions for both “automobile safety and the 
environment” (Berkovec, 1985, 213).  
 
The age of a vehicle and that age correlation with maintenance costs are 
embedded within an individual’s decision of whether or not to scrap a particular 
vehicle. Vehicle age is directly coupled with a vehicle’s emissions. As such, the 
age of a vehicle is significant for both environmental and economic motivational 
determinants.  
 
Incentive Amount   
The determined incentive amount for a particular AVR program can influence 
the decision to participate. Survey data collected during a 1992 Delaware 
accelerated vehicle retirement program was scrutinized to develop a theoretical 
model of vehicle ownership in which it was assumed a vehicle owner will 
maximize the utility available from a single vehicle over the duration of that 
vehicle’s lifetime (Alberini et al, 1995, 94). The analysis sought to model 
participation in a vehicle scrappage program where monetary incentives were 
offered. It was found that a potential vehicle scrappage program participant’s 
“decision to scrap at any point in time depends on the difference between the 
offer price and the owner’s reservation price – the minimum he is willing to 
accept for the vehicle” (Alberini et al., 1995, 94). Predictably, a participant’s 
reservation price would be higher under the influence of several factors 
including: 
1. When a vehicle warranted a high blue book value 
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2. When a vehicle was in better condition,  
3. When a vehicle had a longer expected remaining life,  
4. When a vehicle owner anticipated low vehicle expenditures in the year to 
come, and 
5. When a vehicle owner had fewer additional vehicles as a means of 
alternative transportation (Alberini et al., 1995, 111).  
!
Equally, reservation prices were found to be lowest for vehicles “in the poorest 
condition, with relatively short remaining life,” which concurred with previous 
scrappage theories (Alberini et al., 1995, 111). 
 
Examination of a 1999 AVR program in Greece conjectured that subsidy 
increases in an AVR program would reduce the replacement time of an old car 
and “accelerate the purchase of a new clean car” (Baltas and Xepapadeas, 
1999, 333). An increase in the purchase subsidy offered during an AVR 
program will reduce the number of old vehicles on the road. With respect to the 
effect of subsidies in the automobile sector as a whole that the ability of an 
incentive policy to induce vehicle scrappage is clear; however, the long-term 
effects of an AVR scheme are uncertain (Adda & Cooper, 2000, 778-781). An 
analysis of two AVR schemes in France surmised vehicle scrappage policies 
stimulate individual vehicle sales during the duration of an AVR program, but 
produce a subsequent reduction in vehicle sales - a major argument against the 
2009 U.S. CARS program (Adda & Cooper, 2000, 778, 780-781). The study 
projected that a decrease in vehicle sales will last approximately 15 years, or till 
vehicles sold under the scrappage policy are deemed inoperable (Adda & 
Cooper, 2000, 801). 
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Research in 2007 attempted to characterize the effects of a vehicle scrappage 
subsidy on both new and used car markets as a whole (Esteban, 2007, 4). The 
research maintained that though AVR programs may have environmental 
implications, because they upset the conventional framework of both new and 
used car markets, their repercussions expand beyond their environmental 
benefit (Esteban, 2007, 1). Basing examinations on a Danish AVR program, 
where a bulk of participants used their scrappage subsidy to purchase used 
vehicles, the analysis made a critical contribution to the economic literature on 
vehicle scrappage in determining that “accounting for an active secondary 
market might be critical” in the study of vehicle scrappage subsidies (Esteban, 
2007, 1-2). The used car market has not been considered in many recent AVR 
programs intent on providing economic stimulus including the 2009 U.S. CARS 
program, as the programs have sought to stimulate the economy through the 
sale of new vehicles. As scrapped vehicles are inherently used vehicles, and 
would otherwise be sold in the used car market, AVR scrappage subsidies 
symbolize a “price floor in the used car market” (Esteban, 2007, 2). Two 
significant contributions emerged from the model: AVR subsidies that offer less 
for a used vehicle than the price of that vehicle in the free market may still 
induce scrappage and in order for an AVR subsidy to proficiently induce 
scrappage, at minimum the subsidy must also maximize a participant’s welfare 
(Esteban, 2007, 26). 
 
Intuitively, the amount of obtainable incentive can influence a person’s decision 
to participate in an AVR program. Varying incentive amounts have been used in 
both foreign and domestic AVR programs. As such, incentive amount can a 
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strong motivational tool in persuading a person to participate in an AVR 
program.  
 
Odometer Reading, Vehicle Make, and Vehicle Type 
Several additional determinants influence the decision to scrap a vehicle, 
including a vehicle’s odometer reading, the make of a vehicle, and vehicle type. 
Odometers continually calculate the number of miles a vehicle has been driven 
throughout its lifetime. The number of miles a car has been driven significantly 
impacts the likelihood that car will be scrapped, and, “heavily used cars will be 
replaced sooner” (Chen and Lin, 2006, 734; De Jong, 1996, 268). 
 
Vehicle make may also influence the scrappage decision. Concerning domestic 
vehicle makes, a 2006 analysis found that for Ford and Chevy vehicles, the 
probability of scrappage increases drastically between 5 and 15 years in use, 
reaching a 20 percent chance of survival after 20 years in use. The probability 
that a Dodge vehicle would be scrapped increased the instant that vehicle 
entered the fleet (Chen and Lin, 2006, 741-742). A previous model determined 
that both German and Swiss vehicles tend to have a decreased probability of 
vehicle scrappage, and remain in operation longer than similar makes from 
various countries of origin (De Jong, 1996, 268). 
 
A final determinant of vehicle scrappage is vehicle type. Cynthia Chen has 
argued the idea that vehicle type is one way to forecast whether or not a vehicle 
will be scrapped at length. Her 2005 model determined that minivans were 
expected to be scrapped later than other vehicle types (Chen and Lin, 746). As 
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well, De Jong discovered that vehicles with diesel engines are expected to 
remain in the vehicle fleet for extended lengths of time over vehicles with 
gasoline engines (De Jong, 1996, 268).  
 
Odometer reading, vehicle make, and vehicle type all have significant economic 
effects on the overall value of a particular vehicle. Persons holding vehicles with 
the lowest value are often more inclined to participate in an AVR program, 
should the available incentive supplant the additional financial burden of owning 
a new vehicle. Owners of certain vehicle makes are less likely to participate in a 
vehicle scrappage program. As such, odometer reading, vehicle make, and 
vehicle type are essential aspects to consider in both the design of an AVR 
program, as well as the decision to participate in that program.  
 
Impact of Fuel Costs  
Vehicle acquisitions embody fixed costs for a consumer, but consumers must 
also account for ongoing variable costs when purchasing a vehicle. The bulk of 
variable costs pertaining to car ownership are a result of the cost of fuel (Busse 
et al., 2009, 2). An inquiry as to how gasoline prices affect both new and used 
vehicle markets estimated that the market share of the least fuel-efficient new 
vehicles would decrease by 17.7 percent when gasoline prices increased by a 
mere $1. Conversely, the same inquiry estimated that the most fuel-efficient new 
vehicles would increase market share by 17.5 percent (Busse et al., 2009, 34). 
Concerning used vehicles, the inquiry estimated the total transaction price of 
fuel-inefficient vehicles would fall by more than $1000 when gas prices 
increased by a mere $1, and that the total transaction price of the most fuel-
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efficient vehicles would rise by more than $1500 (Busse et al., 2009, 35). With 
reference to the U.S. CARS program, consumers faced with the possibility of a 
substantial loss in vehicle worth due to fuel price increases found a strong 
motivation to participate in the program as doing so would subsidize their 
vehicle value loss with government funding. Concerning this trend, Li et al. 
found that fuel price increases would encourage vehicle owners to hold their 
fuel-efficient vehicles longer, while owners of the most fuel-inefficient vehicles 
would be prompted to scrap their vehicles (Li et al., 2009, 116). 
  
Goldberg investigated the effect of fuel prices on VMT in 1998. Her model found 
that in the short-term fuel cost increases narrowly bring about a reduction in 
VMT, but that over periods of sustained high fuel costs VMT would decrease 
dramatically (Goldberg, 1998, 19). Additionally, the model determined that an 
increase in the purchase price of a vehicle was more likely to affect consumer 
vehicle choice than a “proportional increase in fuel costs (Goldberg, 1998, 20). 
For the reason that AVR programs provide a decrease in the purchase price of a 
vehicle, especially in times of sustained high gas prices, programs should 
effectively sway more consumers to buy the most fuel-efficient vehicles. Huang 
determined that only 7.2 percent of consumers opted for the most fuel-efficient 
vehicles available during the 2009 U.S. CARS program (Huang, 2010, 3). Still 
evaluations of singular vehicle scrappage programs are not complete without 
examining factors that may have resulted in the need for such a strategy in the 
first place. Throughout the past decade, fuel prices have varied drastically, 




Synopsis of Economic Motivations for AVR 
In elementary terms, economic inquiry of vehicle scrappage dictates that a 
vehicle’s marginal utility decreases with that vehicle’s age combined with a 
number of other factors. As both the likelihood of mechanical breakdown and 
probability of more frequent repair costs increase with age, older vehicles are 
more apt to be scrapped. Furthermore, vehicle values decrease proportionately 
to that vehicle’s age (unless at some occasion in the lifetime of a vehicle, that 
vehicle is deemed to be a “classic.”) Consequently, the decision to scrap a 
vehicle is based upon that vehicle’s current value, alongside the repair costs for 
making the vehicle fully operational and the sustained impact of fuel prices. As 
such, AVR programs most effectively motivate vehicle owners with the most 
inexpensive vehicles. Likewise, rates of participation should increase when 
scrappage incentives are largest (Allen et al., 2009, 9). 
 
Urban Planning Motivations 
Accelerated Vehicle Retirement can aid in eradicating a number of 
environmental, social, and spatial ills in urban areas caused by motor vehicle 
transportation. Namely, AVR can help retaliate against global warming, aid in 
the relief of congestion in increasingly urbanized locations, increase vehicle and 
road safety, and diminish air pollution. Vehicles emissions are responsible for 
prodigious amounts of CO2 and greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to 
global warming. Global warming may produce a host of negative externalities 
including: population displacement brought about by rising sea levels, the 
extinction of climate sensitive species, and more frequent hurricane and drought 
periods (Markham, 2009). Entwined with global climate change is a global 
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increase in air pollution. Air pollution poses significant respiratory health threats 
to citizens in urban areas. Removing older vehicles from roadways in both urban 
and rural areas is an inherent goal of an AVR program, and one practical 
method urban planners might employ to combat climate change. Whether an 
AVR program focuses specifically on an environmental or economic goal is 
irrelevant; a reduction in vehicle emissions will transpire.  
 
AVR programs may aid in the removal of a great number of vehicles in urban 
areas, which may reduce vehicle congestion and increase air quality. As 
urbanization of the world’s population continues at a frenzied pace, space 
restrictions in urban areas prevent residents from efficiently owning and 
operating an automobile. Complications resulting from automobile congestion in 
urban areas can harm residents’ productivity and health.  Planners must seek 
methods to properly increase traffic flow without jeopardizing air quality. While 
public mass transit is the most efficient method for moving people throughout 
urban areas, it can be expensive to implement. AVR can help reduce the 
number of vehicles in an area, when the program is designed to offer a cash 
incentive toward something other than the purchase of a new vehicle. 
 
A myriad of people worldwide are injured or die in traffic accidents each year. 
Urban planners face concerns regarding expected service levels for emergency 
services in particular areas, issues with roadway design, as well as the general 
health, safety, and welfare of residents. In instances where AVR programs offer 
incentives toward the purchase of a new vehicle, a reduction in older vehicles 
will result in overall increase in vehicles equipped with modern safety features. 
Advances in vehicle headlights, airbags, and other standard safety features 
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occur each model year. Replacing older vehicles with new vehicles may help 
prevent a number of traffic related deaths, and offer planners a viable tactic for 
improving the overall safety of roadways in a given community.  
 
Urban planners are instinctively concerned with the health, safety, and welfare 
of residents in a particular area. Therefore, global warming concerns along with 
more general air quality concerns and traffic safety involvements are inherently 
urban planning matters. AVR is one method urban planners might consider 
when attempting to alleviate the harms of an auto dependent society. AVR can 
be instituted by urban planners to efficiently lighten the burdens caused by 
motor vehicles.  
 
Past AVR Programs 
For as long as motor vehicles have been an integral part of personal mobility, 
Accelerated Vehicle Retirement (AVR,) alternatively identified as vehicle 
scrappage, cash-for-clunkers, or fleet renewal, has been proposed as a catalyst 
for hastening the vehicle fleet turnover rate. In the 1920s, General Motors 
Corporation (GM) concocted a method for accelerating new car sales by 
requiring dealers to pay $5 into a general fund for each new vehicle they 
ordered. Dealers then received $50 from the fund for older vehicles taken in 
trade and subsequently scrapped (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003, 146). The 
scheme was designed to remove older vehicles from the national fleet for the 




Whereas the 2009 cash-for-clunkers program symbolized the first federal 
program of its kind in the U.S., the notion that such a strategy could be effective 
was not a contemporary one. The George H. W. Bush administration proposed a 
cash-for-clunkers program in 1992, “under which states and companies [could 
have met] Federal clean-air requirements by buying and scrapping the old 
vehicles that generate the most pollution” (Hershey, 1992). The nation’s first AVR 
program took place in 1990 in Los Angeles (Hsu and Sperling, 1994, 1444). 
Entitled the “Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Project (SCRAP)” the program 
scrapped 8,376 pre-1971 vehicles over a four-month period for a bounty of $700 
cash (Hsu and Sperling, 1994, 1444; Dill, 2001, 7). Table 6 lists 75 known past 
AVR programs: 
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Table 6: Past Accelerated Vehicle Retirement Programs 
!
Program Dates 
1 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP) 6/1/1990 - 11/18/1990 
2 Greece 1/1/1991 - 3/31/1993 
3 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase I 1992-1993 
4 France 10/1/1992 -12/31/92 
5 Delaware Vehicle Buyback Program 1992-1993 
6 Illinois EPA (Chicago) 1993 
7 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II) 5/26/93 
8 Hungary 9/1/1993 - 2/1994 
9 Santa Barbara Old Car buyback program 1993 - 1996 
10 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase II 1993-1994 
11 Denver Total Clean Cars Program 12/1993 - 04/1994 
12 Denmark 1/1/1994 - 6/30/1995 
13 Spain 4/1/1994 - 10/1/1994 
14 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III) 1994 
15 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase III 1994-1995 
16 France 2/1994 - 06/1995 
17 Spain 11/1994 - 6/1/1995 
18 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV) 1995 
19 San Joaquin Valley Vehicle Buy-Back Program 1995-1996 
20 Ireland 1/6/1995 -12/31/1997 
21 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase IV 1995-1996 
22 France 09/1995 - 09/30/1996 
23 Norway 1996 
24 British Columbia Scrap-It Pilot Program 4/1996 - 12/1998 
25 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase V 1996-1998 




27 Italy 1/1/1997 - 9/30/1997 
28 San Joaquin Valley Vehicle Buy-Back Program  1997-1998 
29 Italy 2/1/1998 - 9/30/1998 
30 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program 11/1998 - 11/1999 
31 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase VI 1998-1999 
32 California Consumer Assistance Program 1998 - 6/30/2001 
33 Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program  12/1/2009 - present 
34 British Columbia Scrap-It 1/1/1999 - present 
35 Argentina 3/22/1999 - 11/14/2000 
36 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase VII 1999-2000 
37 Santa Barbara Old Car buyback program 5/1999 - 8/2001 
38 Maine High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program 11/1/2000 - 10/8/2002 
39 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program 7/1/2001 - 12/31/2001 
40 Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project 3/21/2001 - 3/31/2002 
41 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program 1/1/2002 - 12/31/2005 
42 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase VIII 2002 -2003 
43 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program FY 06/07 
44 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback program 2006 - 2008 
45 Santa Barbara Old Car buyback program 2006 - 12/31/2010 
46 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program FY 07/08 
47 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS) 06/2007 - 04/2009 
48 Texas Drive a Clean Machine 12/2007 - 11/30/2010 
49 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program FY 08 - 2/8/2009 
50 Spain Plan VIVE 12/1/2008–10/1/2010 
51 France Prime a la casse 12/4/2008–12/31/2009 
52 Portugal Plan I 1/1/2009–8/7/2009 
53 Germany 1/14/2009–12/31/2009 
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54 Cyprus 1/16/2009 - 9/16/2009 
55 Luxembourg 1/22/2009–10/1/2010 
56 Canada (Retire Your Ride) 2/1/2009 - 3/31/2011 
57 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program 2/9/2009 - 12/31/2010 
58 Italy 2/7/2009–12/31/2009 
59 Slovakia Plan I 3/9/2009–3/25/2009 
60 Austria  (Verschrottungspra!mie) 4/1/2009–12/12/2009 
61 Slovakia Plan II 4/6/2009–12/31/2009 
62 United Kingdom 5/1/2009–3/31/2010 
63 Spain Plan 2000E 5/22/2009–5/18/2010 
64 The Netherlands 5/29/2009 - 12/31/2010 
65 Japan 6/19/2009 - 3/31/2010 
66 United States 7/1/2009 - 8/24//2009 
67 Portugal Plan II 8/8/2009–12/31/2009 
68 Greece 9/30/2009–11/2/2009 
69 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback program 2009-2010 
70 France Prime a la casse 2 1/1/2010 - 6/30/2010 
71 Ireland 1/1/2010 - 12/30/2010 
72 Romania 2/15/2010 - 11/23/2010 
73 Russia 3/8/2010 - 12/31/2010 
74 France Prime a la casse 3 7/1/2010 - 12/31/2010 
75 Cyprus 10/11/2010 - 12/13/2010 




Past Accelerated Vehicle Retirement programs list various primary objectives. 
Several of the first AVR programs sought vehicle scrappage as a way to earn 
MSERCs in heavily polluted areas. Other programs have pursued broad based 
emissions pollution reduction as a primary objective. More recent programs 
have employed AVR for the primary purpose of stimulating new car sales. Still 
other programs pursued primary objectives specific to an issue found only in 
their respective location.  (See Tables 52 – 61) 
 
Varying Scales 
Past Accelerated Vehicle Retirement programs have occurred in areas with 
divergent populations. The total population of an area where an AVR program is 
conducted can have ramifications on the number of vehicles retired and number 
of participants throughout an AVR program’s tenure. All other factors being 
equal (incentive amount, eligible vehicle criteria, and government investment) 
one would assume that AVR programs carried out in areas with larger 
populations would generate greater total program effectiveness. (See Tables 16 
– 20) 
 
2009 Economic Climate 
Faced with escalating fuel prices, a slowing global economy, and rising 
unemployment, automobile purchases were a distant consideration for much of 
the American citizenry in 2009 (Canis and Yacobucci, 2010, 1-2). The 
accumulated economic misfortunes of 2009 exposed weaknesses in both 
foreign and domestic automotive industry business models. However, obstacles 
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for automakers were present long before President Obama announced the 
enactment of the first federal AVR program.   
 
The U.S. automotive industry had encountered a sustained reduction in vehicle 
sales over the last three decades, attributed to reductions in quality and the 
emergence of viable foreign vehicle alternatives (Clark et. al., 2009, 1).  In the 
summer of 2008, with heightened fear of global terrorism and wars in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the price of oil reached a record $147 a barrel (Leech, 
2010). Subsequently, gas prices climbed in many parts of the country from 
prices just over $2 per gallon to an average of over $4 per gallon, more than $5 
in some parts, resulting in a national average of $4.11 in the U.S. (Leech, 2010; 
Canis and Yacobucci, 2010, 2). New motor vehicle sales annually account for 
around 10 percent of total consumer merchandise spending in the leading 
industrial economies (Stanford, 2010, 2). Faced with a sinking economy and 
high fuel prices, scores of Americans restricted spending on both major and 
trivial purchases. At the same time, owners of the most fuel-inefficient vehicles 
began to reconsider their means of transportation. Yet, faced with a reduced 
availability of credit, many consumers opted to suffer financially, via increased 
expenditures on fuel, rather than suffer the loss of resale values in the vehicle 
market (Canis and Yacobucci, 2010, 1-2).  
 
The result of combined economic hardships was a population largely apathetic 
to the U.S. automobile market. Nationwide, 2008 vehicle sales endured a 2.9 
million unit sales decrease in cars and light trucks from the previous year and a 
4.6 million unit decrease from the vehicle sales zenith observed at the turn of the 
century (Canis and Yacobucci, 2010, 1-2). 2009 vehicle sales were down 35 
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percent in the U.S., 11 percent in Canada, and 41 percent in Russia (AECA, 
2010).  
 
The year 2009 saw trials affecting the automotive industry including:  
1. a global recession 
2. a crisis in global credit markets 
3. bankruptcy of both General Motors Corporation (GM) and Chrysler LLC 
4. financial bailout packages provided by the federal government for both 
GM and Chrysler that included provisions for governmental ownership 
5. automobile plant closings 
6. automotive worker buyouts, and 
7. the cash-for-clunkers program at summers end (Canis and Yacobucci, 
2010, 1). 
 
Financial bailouts were allocated to support domestic automakers in the fall of 
2008 by then President George W. Bush. North American automotive industry 
bailouts were unique to international approaches in two respects:  
1. Government assistance was requisite to ensure the automakers survival, 
and 
2. The rescue of the U.S. automotive manufacturers “occurred within the 
context of a continental market that has come to be dominated by 
offshore-based producers” (Stanford, 2010, 2).  
 
Automotive industry bailouts met varying degrees of public support and 
suspicion. Many argued the dilemma of the domestic automotive industry was 
the result of several decades’ worth of declining quality. Others believed the 
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automotive industry should be left to meet its own demise. Still, others reasoned 
that should the automotive industry fail, the nation’s entire economy would 
implode. The devastating economic consequences of 2008 and 2009 
amalgamated so that by mid-2009, theories began to advance concerning the 
improbability of the U.S. auto sector’s ability to survive. A new mechanism was 
required to ensure the automotive industry would endure. 
 
Timeline 
A host of hurdles stood between the idea of a national vehicle scrappage 
program and the eventual execution of the Cash-for-clunkers program of 2009. 
A chain of events that began a year prior to the program’s completion are 
important to note in order to describe the method by which the NHTSA elected 
to conduct the federal AVR program. The timeline in table 7 details the events 













Table 7: U.S.  Cash-For-Clunkers Timeline of Events 
September 29, 2008 
The U.S. House of Representatives reject a $700 billion 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) rescue bill by a 
vote of 228-205, subsequently the Dow fell 777.68 points, 
the largest one-day loss in history. 
October 1, 2008 The U.S. Senate passes an amended TARP bill 
October 3, 2008 The U.S. House of Representatives votes in favor of TARP funds for the banking industry. 
November 14, 2008 
President George W. Bush implores Congress to release 
$25 billion in loans to U.S. automakers. Controversy 
erupts, as loans were not originally intended to relieve 
automakers. 
December 19, 2008 $17.4 billion in TARP funds are distributed to GM and Chrysler 
January 2009 A Cash for Clunkers bill is proposed in Congress 
February 17, 2009 Both GM and Chrysler ask for additional funds totaling $5 billion. 
March 30, 2009 President Barack Obama asks GM CEO, Rick Wagoner to resign as part of a total restructuring plan 
April 30, 2009 Chrysler announces that it will file for bankruptcy 
June 1, 2009 
GM enters bankruptcy. The U.S. government provides the 
company $30.1 billion in additional TARP funds in 
exchange for 60% ownership in the company once it 
emerges from bankruptcy. 
June 9, 2009 
The Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act 
(CARS) of 2009 is passed by the U.S. House of 
Representatives 
June 18, 2009 CARS is passed by the U.S. Senate 
July 10, 2009 GM emerges from bankruptcy  
July 24, 2009 President Barack Obama signs the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009 
July 27, 2009 The CARS program begins at U.S. dealerships 
August 7, 2009 Congress appropriates an additional $2 billion for the CARS program 
August 25, 2009 The CARS program ends  
(Clark et. al, 2009, 2-3; Canis and Yacobucci, 2010, NHTSA, 2009, Li et al., 2010, 7). 
 
Though it lasted a mere 55 days, the U.S. Cash-for-clunkers program of 2009 
stimulated the U.S. economy through an increase of vehicle sales, and altered 
the age makeup of the national vehicle fleet (Huang, 2010, 2). 
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2009 U.S. Cash for Clunkers 
The Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009 (CARS) (U.S.C. 49, 
§ 32901) enacted by Congress was signed into law by President Barack Obama 
on June 24, 2009 and required the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) to administer an AVR program (NHTSA, 2009, 3). 
NHTSA was mandated to formulate a strategy for the CARS program within 30 
days of the law’s ratification. NHTSA was not instructed to submit the proposed 
strategy back to Congress prior to the strategy’s implementation (NHTSA, 2009, 
5,) a controversial aspect for people concerned with fiscal responsibility.  The 
Act initially appropriated $1 billion for the CARS program, for which $50 million 
was to be towards administrative expenses; 12 days into the program Congress 
provided an additional $2 billion was provided (Pub. L. 111-47) owing to the 
program’s early success (NHTSA, 2009 3-4).  
 
Originally deemed the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009, 
the designation was later only used with reference to the act signed by the 
President in June. The Acronym CARS denoted “Car Allowance Rebate System” 
throughout the program’s tenure. Responsible for the first federal AVR program 
in the United States, NHTSA worked in conjunction with the EPA to determine 
fuel economy ratings for both clunker and new-vehicle eligibility throughout the 
program (NHTSA, 2009, 5-6). The CARS program officially launched July 27th, 
2009 and was terminated prematurely on August 25, 2009, as funds allocated 
by Congress for the program had been exhausted (Li et al., 2009).  
The U.S. CARS program combined two goals: promoting auto sales to benefit a 
lackluster economy that had been especially hard on U.S. automotive 
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manufacturers, and to improve the environment by replacing old vehicles with 
vehicles that provided an increase in fuel economy (Yacobucci and Canis, 
2009, 2; Li et al., 2010, 4, U.S. GAO, 2010). CARS offered consumers a financial 
incentive towards the purchase or lease of a new vehicle, if that vehicle 
represented an increase in fuel economy when compared to a consumer’s old 
vehicle (Yacobucci and Canis, 2009, 1; U.S. GAO, 2010, 4). The financial 
incentive provided to consumers was a rebate of up to $4,500 based on the set 
of criteria in table 8 formulated by NHTSA (Yacobucci and Canis, 2009, 1; 
NHTSA, 2009, 6) including:   
 
 
Table 8: CARS Rebate Value Criteria 
 
    
 















At least 5 mpg 
higher than 
trade-in 




  22 mpg minimum 18 mpg minimum 15 mpg minimum 
   
    $3,500  At least 4 mpg 
higher than trade-
in 
At least 2 mpg 
higher than 
trade-in 
At least 1 mpg 
higher than trade-
in OR trade-in is a 
MY2001 or newer 
category 3 truck 
Trade-in is 
MY2001 or newer 
category 3 truck 
  
22 mpg minimum 18 mpg minimum 15 mpg minimum Trade-in is of 
similar size or 
larger than new 
truck 
(Yacobucci and Canis, 2009, 4). 
 
 




Four criteria were also established regarding trade-in vehicle eligibility. The 
criteria were designed to ensure that vehicles received throughout the program 
would not otherwise continue to be utilized as mode of transportation. Table 9 
details eligibility criteria established for the U.S. CARS program: 
 
Table 9: CARS Vehicle Eligibil i ty Criteria 
Trade in Vehicle 
• Is in drivable condition 
• Has been both continuously insured, consistent with the laws of your 
States, and continuously registered to the same owner for at least 
one year immediately prior to the trading-in your vehicle under the 
CARS program 
• Manufactured less than 25 years before the date of trade (i.e., 
before mid- to late- 1984) and, in the case of category 3 trucks, not 
later than model year 2001 
• Has combined MPG of 18 or less (this does not apply to category 3 




• Is new (i.e., legal title has not been transferred by anyone) 
• Has manufacturer’s suggested retail price of $45,000 or less 
(Li et al., 2010; U.S. GAO, 2010, 5) 
 
Vehicles traded-in during the program were dismantled to ensure they did not 
reappear in the vehicle fleet and continue polluting (Li et al., 2010, 7). 
 
Motivation 
The idea that federal programs can be used to stimulate national spending can 
be traced to British economist John Maynard Keynes. Keynesian economics 
espouses the view that governments should stabilize consumer demand 
through deficit spending to prevent economic recessions (Smiley, 2008). Where 
classical economics maintains that macroeconomic business cycles are 
efficient, Keynesian economics argues that government intervention may be 
necessary to stabilize national economies during times of economic hardship 
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(McKeehan 2008 4). Keynesian economics considers unemployment to be a 
“more serious problem than inflation,” and advocates the “multiplier effect” 
where expenditures resonate throughout an economy (McKeehan 2008 4). 
 
President George W. Bush signed H.R. 5140 – The Economic Growth Act of 
2008 on February 1, 2008. The first of what would be a litany of Keynesian 
economic stimulus spending, offered a tax rebate for working families, 
provisions for capital expenditures made by small business, and increased 
government housing loan limits (Hutchison and Hughes 2008). President 
Obama signed the American Recovery and Investments Act H.R. 1 of 2009 on 
February 17, 2009. The act intended to save existing jobs and create new ones, 
spur economic activity through government infrastructure spending, and 
provide tax cuts and benefits for working families (recovery.gov 2010). Both acts 
evoked the Keynesian principle that a government could generate economic 
activity through deficit spending. The supplemental Consumer Assistance to 
Recycle and Save Act of 2009 (CARS) (U.S.C. 49, § 32901) signed by President 
Obama on June 24, 2009, built directly on the assumption that governments 
could spend their way out of a recession. As motor vehicles exhibit a substantial 
purchase price, should enough consumers opt to partake of government offered 
incentives, reverberations would be felt throughout the U.S. economy. Such 
motivations led President Obama and both houses of Congress to ratify the 
Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009. The motivations were 
not exclusively intended to relieve ailing automakers, but rather, the U.S. 





In an internal memorandum dated April 22, 2010 NHTSA Administrator David L. 
Strickland described the CARS program as a “remarkable success story and an 
example of exemplary service provided by the Federal Government to the 
American people in times of crisis” (2010, 1). Strickland went on to remark that 
the “program was highly successful in accomplishing its primary goals of 
stimulating the economy and aiding the environment (Strickland, 2010, 1). Table 
10 details the numerical extent of the program: 
 
Table 10: Results of the U.S. Cars Program 
Component Total 
Number of participating dealerships 18,908 
Number of participating states 50* 
Voucher applications 690,114 
Paid vouchers 677,842 
Cancelled transactions 12,272 
Average voucher amount 4,209 
Total voucher amount $2.85 billion 
Total new vehicles sold or leased (passenger cars) 401,274 
Total new vehicles sold or leased (light trucks) 274,602 
Total new vehicles sold or leased (heavy trucks) 1,966 
Average combined EPA fuel rating 24.9 
Replaced vehicle average combined EPA fuel rating 15.8 
Average difference in fuel economy 9.2 
Percent of vehicles manufactured domestically 49% 
Estimated increase in GDP $3.8 to $6.8 billion 
Jobs created or saved over 60,000 
Estimated reduction in fuel consumption over 25 years 824 million gallons 
Estimated reduction in fuel consumption annually 33 million gallons 
Estimated reduction in carbon dioxide over 25 years 9 million metric tone 
Estimated social benefit of carbon dioxide reduction $278 million 
* as well as the District of Columbia, Guam, the Northern Mariana and Virgin Islands, 





Throughout the CARS program, trade-in vehicles were primarily domestically 
manufactured.  The majority of decommissioned vehicles came from Ford, 
Chevrolet, and Dodge. 46.6% percent of the new purchases came from Asian 
manufacturers Toyota, Honda, Nissan, and Hyundai. The discrepancy raises 
doubt about how fully the stimulus money went to the American economy.  
 
Public Reception 
The national news media squandered little time in touting opinions about the 
proposed success or failure of the CARS program. The Berkeley Electronic 
Press ballyhooed early estimates that the CARS program represented a “net 
drain on society of roughly $2,000 per vehicle” and claimed the “total welfare 
loss to be $1.4 billion.” The same article acknowledged “the popularity of CARS 
should be no surprise: it gives participants a substantial gift… meanwhile the 
burden of the program is dispersed over a large group of taxpayers” (Abram 
and Parsons, 2009, 3). Others conjectured that program was designed to divert 
attention from the already deep intervention of the government into the U.S. 
automotive industry (Graham, 2009). An article entitled “Cash for Clunkers: A 
Retrospective” appeared in The American in June of 2010, and put forward the 
idea of a CARS type AVR program during the OPEC fuel crisis under President 
Carter. The article surmised the implications that such a program would have 
had on modern classic vehicle markets, as well as the idea that the CARS 
program obliterated the concept that “one man’s trash is another’s treasure.” In 
the rather scathing article the author challenged that CARS “broken policy” was 
“an old-fashioned wealth transfer” and that “the policy allowed politicians to 
claim success despite failure” (Borders, 2010). 
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Jeffrey D. Sachs in an article for the Scientific American put forth “billions of 
dollars were spent quickly without clear answers on what we were getting for our 
money.” Sachs also alleged there were “countless ways to reduce CO2 
emissions” that “are less expensive than smashing up autos five years before 
their natural demise” (Sachs, 2009). The New American went on to propose 
“consumers participate, of course, because they are able to get more money for 
their old cars than the old cars are worth – in many cases thousands of dollars 
more” (Benoit, 2009).  
 
Albeit the 2009 U.S. CARS program had disproportionate media attention and a 
colossal economic cost, the brief duration of the program alongside vast 
government expenditures across a host other economic sectors has afforded 
the program little academic evaluation to date. In spite of this, a small number of 
assessments have been conducted. Three comprehensive examinations of the 
U.S. CARS program have ensued since the program’s termination that account 
for auto sales and jobs (economic factors,) as well as the program’s effects on 
the environment. A CARS synopsis reported to the House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, as well as the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations 
in December of 2009 by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. April 
2010 provided an additional CARS assessment by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office. A subsequent CARS evaluation by a private government 
think-tank transpired in August 2010. Studies vary in degrees of agreement with 
NHTSA Administrator David L. Strickland’s summation that the “CARS program 
achieved the objectives set out by Congress to increase automotive sales and 




Of the first environmental evaluations to surface regarding the CARS program 
was a lengthy August 13, 2009 report entitled The Implied Cost of Carbon 
Dioxide under the Cash for Clunkers Program. The analysis suggested, through 
slack calculation, that the program was, at best, a highly expensive way to 
reduce vehicle pollution (Knittel, 2009, 1). A scenario which used a computation 
of the highest rebate offered for a trade-in vehicle under the CARS program, 
$4,500, estimated that the per ton cost of saved carbon dioxide under the 
program was on average over $400 per ton. The average cost was reached 
using the following parameters:  
1. $4500 rebate 
2. Average VMT of 12,000 miles 
3. Clunker fuel economy of 16 mpg 
4. New vehicle fuel economy of 25 mpg 
5. Per year savings of 270 gallons of gasoline by switching vehicles 
6. Carbon Dioxide creation of 20 pounds for a burned gallon of gasoline 
 
In determining price estimates for greenhouse gas (GHG) allowances under the 
Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) estimates that the price for GHG emission allowances over the period 
2011 – 2019 will cost on average $23 (CBO, 2009, 11).  At a cost of $23, the 
analysis’ preliminary projections are that the U.S. CARS program exceeded this 
average by approximately $375 per ton (Knittel, 2009, 3). A similar valuation of 
CO2 emissions reduction by Li et al., estimated the cost ranged from $91 to 
$295 per ton (Li et al., 2010, 6).  
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A more recent evaluation of the CARS program attempted to address effects on 
employment using a geometric decay function. Between both vehicle assembly 
and parts industry employment, the model found that one job-year was created 
for every 67 vehicles sold under the program, or 3,676 job-years total (Li et al., 
2010, 28). The same study determined that CARS induced approximately .39 
million-vehicle sales throughout the program’s duration (Li et al., 2010, 20). 
 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) maintained, “the extent to which 
the program stimulated vehicle sales, as measured by the number of vehicle 
sales attributable to the CARS program, is unclear” (GAO, 2010, 13). The reason 
for the ambiguous nature of their analysis concerns “incremental vehicle sales,” 
or vehicles that were sold as a direct result of the program that would not have 
otherwise occurred. They determine incremental vehicle sales cannot be 
accurately calculated (GAO, 2010, 13). Equally, the GAO maintains that the 
program’s effect on gross domestic product is uncertain; this, too as a result of 
incremental vehicle sales remaining undefined (GAO, 2020, 16). The GAO 
speculates the lack of consensus of the CARS program’s impact on employment 
can be attributed to incremental vehicle sales as well (GAO, 2010, 17).  
 
Despite the near constant advertising of the CARS program’s effects on the 
economy by President Obama and the democrat-led Congress that helped to 
pass the legislation, to a great extent evaluations of the program’s effect on the 
economy remain inconclusive. Opponents argue that the program, in effect, 
subsidized a large number of vehicle consumers. Proponents maintain that the 
program preserved auto-manufacturing jobs by delaying plant closures due to 
an increased need for production. Despite both accusations, the central 
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question remains – would vehicles sold throughout the duration of the CARS 
program have been sold without the program? Thus far, results are inconclusive.  
 
Environmental Evaluation 
Opponents of CARS argue that environmental impact of the program was 
abysmal. One point of contention maintains that in the absence of the program, 
fleet fuel economy would have improved due to previously imposed more 
stringent CAFE standards under the Bush administration (Huang, 2010, 2). In 
spite of this, Huang (2010) found that for the reason that an extra $1,000 was 
awarded to consumers who gained the most extreme improvements in fuel-
efficiency, 7.2 percent of consumers elected to purchase vehicles with the 
highest fuel-efficiency ratings (Huang, 2010, 3). Such behavior produced an 
environmental benefit by reducing emissions (as vehicles with aged emissions 
were traded-in and scrapped) and a decrease in fuel consumption (Huang, 
2010, 3).  
 
Researchers at the University of Michigan’s Transportation Research Institute 
later conducted an analysis of the effect of the CARS program on vehicle fuel 
economy. The study examined the average fuel economy of vehicles purchased 
in both July and August 2009, and found that average fuel economy improved a 
mere 0.6 in July 2009 and 0.7 in August 2009 (Sivak and Schottle, 2009, 4). An 
additional estimation determined the CARS program reduced the total gasoline 
consumption of trade-in vehicles by approximately 2,915 gallons – “8 days’ 
worth of current U.S. gasoline consumption (Li et al., 2010, 23). The GAO 
maintains that while the CARS program succeeded in placing more fuel-efficient 
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vehicles on the Road, the extent to which the program reduced fuel 
consumption is uncertain (GAO, 2010, 18).  
 
Comparable to economic evaluations of the CARS program, estimations 
concerning the environmental impacts are largely inconclusive to date. We know 
that the CARS program eradicated nearly 700,000 vehicles from America’s 
roadways and replaced them with vehicles that, at the very least, represented 
increases in fuel economy. By itself, this accomplishment should have 
significant impacts on environmental quality. When fuel life-cycle CO2 emissions 
and alleged increases in VMT are taken into consideration, supposed 
environmental improvements under the program may be canceled out. 
 
Alternatives to Accelerated Vehicle Retirement 
Few programs exist comparable in both scale and scope to AVR.  As AVR can 
be implemented at various civic scales, alternatives must account for dilemmas 
that can arise at more than a few dimensions. To date, only two alternatives 
appear qualified to work in tandem or supplant AVR programs. 
 
Inspection and Maintenance Programs 
When considering the impacts of an AVR program it is common sense to 
ascertain how programs might work in conjunction with a vehicle inspection and 
maintenance (I/M) strategy. I/M programs require motorists to periodically 
subject their vehicles to emissions testing at a local inspection facility 
(Harrington et al., 154). Vehicle I/M strategies effectively identify the highest 
polluters in a vehicle fleet and enforce procedures for their repair (Yamamoto et 
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al., 2004, 906). Whereas AVR programs induce vehicle replacement more often 
than not at the end of a vehicle’s lifetime, I/M programs ascertain whether or not 
a vehicle is operating efficiently, in terms of emissions controls systems, 
throughout the lifetime of a vehicle. Few other mechanisms exist to ensure 
vehicles emissions systems are up to standard after purchase (Moghadam, 
2010, 285).  
 
The EPA has suggested that vehicle scrappage in conjunction with an I/M 
program can “improve program benefit and/or reduce costs” (EPA, 1993, 
Section VIII). Stringent I/M programs can increase vehicle scrappage (Hahn, 
1995, 240). Recent evaluations of I/M programs in France dictate that vehicle 
owners have a propensity to keep their vehicles 20% longer on average in  an 
area with an I/M policy, as vehicles are apt to be maintained more effectively 
over the course of their operable lifetime (Yamamoto et al., 2004, 923-924). 
 
Apprehensions concerning the costs of conducting a vehicle I/M program, and 
a program’s forced cost upon a local citizenry, often prevent this strategy from 
emerging as a convincing approach towards emissions reduction.  In an 
examination of an Arizona I/M program, Harrington et al. found that owners of 
the oldest vehicles will suffer the most substantial repair costs under an I/M 
program, as older vehicles failed I/M tests most often (Harrington et al., 2000, 
162). Such a situation generates uncertainties pertaining to fairness. Still, the 
same analysis found that the oldest vehicles cede the highest emissions 
reductions (Harrington et al., 2000, 162). For that reason, researchers have 
found that minute reductions in pollution abatement targets for I/M programs, 
yield substantial cost reductions (Moghadam & Livernois, 2010, 297). 
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Additionally, decreasing the inspection testing intervals from an annual 
requirement to one that takes place biannually could significantly reduce costs 
as well as aid in a more effective strategy for targeting high polluting vehicles 
(Moghadam & Livernois, 2010, 296).   
 
As national I/M programs do not exist, and states vary greatly on the level of 
scrutiny applied during vehicle inspection, I/M programs cannot be viewed as a 
national alternative to vehicle scrappage. Rather, a continual I/M program that 
enforced vehicle scrappage after a certain point in an emissions control 
system’s degradation would be preferable. As such the most effective scenario 
would be a vehicle scrappage program performed in union with an I/M program. 
 
Hybrid Vehicle Purchase Tax Credit 
Hybrid vehicle income tax credits were provided by the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 between December 31, 2005 and December 31, 2010 (IRS, 2007). Income 
tax credits were provided to consumers that purchased a number of hybrid cars 
and several hybrid sport utility vehicles and trucks. Foreseen as an approach to 
effectively alter consumer purchase behavior, hybrid vehicle tax credits were 
available in amounts ranging from $3,100.00 to $250.00 depending on the type 
of vehicle purchased and that vehicle’s fuel economy (IRS, 2007.) Despite the 
fact that a number of consumers took advantage of the tax credit, hybrid vehicle 
market share was a mere 3% in 2010 (Miravete and Moral, 2010, 4). Hybrid 
vehicles remain an anomaly in the U.S. alongside a new vehicle fleet largely 
dependent on gasoline propulsion. As such, consumers remain wary of new 
hybrid vehicle technology. Hybrid vehicle income tax credits are the closest 
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current alternative to a vehicle scrappage program in the U.S. because they 
effectively disperse a cash incentive to consumers who opt to trade-in their old 
vehicle for a new hybrid vehicle. The difference between hybrid vehicle income 
tax credits and a vehicle scrappage program is that consumers claim the 
incentive at some point in the future (on their income tax statement) rather than 
at the point of sale. This delayed satisfaction may explain why more of the 
credits have not been utilized, and why hybrid vehicle market share remains 
low.  
 
Government Performance Results Act of 1993 
The Government Performance Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) required federal 
government agencies to formulate goals and performance monitoring plans for 
proposed programs within an agency’s budget (Heen 2000 1). GPRA 
correspondingly required agencies to measure and report program outcomes to 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and to Congress (Heen 2000 1). 
Congress enacted GPRA after finding:  
• “waste and inefficiency in Federal programs undermine the confidence of 
the American people in the Government and reduces the Federal 
Government's ability to address adequately vital public needs; 
• Federal managers are seriously disadvantaged in their efforts to improve 
program efficiency and effectiveness, because of insufficient articulation 




• Congressional policymaking, spending decisions and program oversight 
are seriously handicapped by insufficient attention to program 
performance and results (U.S. Congress 103-62). 
 
The Government Performance Results Act had a number of purposes including:  
• to “improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the 
Federal Government, by systematically holding Federal agencies 
accountable for achieving program results;” 
• to “initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot projects in 
setting program goals, measuring program performance against those 
goals, and reporting publicly on their progress;” 
• to “improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by 
promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer 
satisfaction;” 
• to “help Federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that 
they plan for meeting program objectives and by providing them with 
information about program results and service quality;”  
• to “improve congressional decision making by providing more objective 
information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative 
effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending; and” 
• to “improve internal management of the Federal Government” (U.S. 
Congress 103-62). 
 
All agencies of the federal government, including independent agencies and 
agencies classified as government corporations, are bound by GPRA. The 
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Legislative Branch, Judicial Branch, Central Intelligence Agency, Panama Canal 
Commission, and the Postal Rate Commission are not required to follow GPRA 
guidelines. As well, the Postal Service has separate GPRA requirements (OMB 
Watch 2002).  
 
GPRA requires government agencies to formulate three plans including: 
• a strategic plan 
• a performance plan, and 
• performance results (OMB Watch 2002). 
 
Strategic Plan 
GPRA requires agencies to develop a strategic plan. The strategic plan must 
include the following:  
• a comprehensive mission statement covering the major functions and 
operations of the agency; 
• general goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and 
objectives, for the major functions and operations of the agency; 
• a description of how the goals and objectives are to be achieved, 
including a description of the operational processes, skills and 
technology, and the human, capital, information, and other resources 
required to meet those goals and objectives; 
• a description of how the performance goals included in the plan shall be 
related to the general goals and objectives in the strategic plan; 
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• an identification of those key factors external to the agency and beyond 
its control that could significantly affect the achievement of the general 
goals and objectives; and 
• a description of the program evaluations used in establishing or revising 
general goals and objectives, with a schedule for future program 
evaluations” (US Congress 103-62) 
 
The formulation of a strategic plan, as outlined by GPRA, could have positive 
effects on implementation of AVR programs at various scales. The clear wording 
and precise requirements outlined by the GPRA strategic plan are in place to 
ensure both a minimal margin of error and program transparency. Both 
elements are essential to an AVR program’s success. As well, GPRA requires 
that in developing a strategic plan, government agencies consult with Congress 
and solicit input from outside stakeholders who might be affected by the plan 
(OMB Watch 2002).  
 
Performance Plan 
GPRA also requires agencies to develop an annual performance plan. The 
performance plan requires agencies to do the following:  
• “establish performance goals to define the level of performance to be 
achieved by a program activity; 
• express such goals in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form  
• briefly describe the operational processes, skills and technology, and the 




• establish performance indicators to be used in measuring or assessing 
the relevant outputs, service levels, and outcomes of each program 
activity; 
• provide a basis for comparing actual program results with the established 
performance goals; and 
• describe the means to be used to verify and validate measured values” 
(U.S. Congress 103-62). 
!
Performance plans, as required by GPRA, can aid AVR programs in attaining 
established objectives. In setting numerical goals, the performance plan, can 
help an agency or program ascertain whether or not a program has been 
successful and provide opportunity to modify a program while the program is in 
action.  The requirement of performance plans to “establish performance 
indicators to be used in measuring… outcomes” of a program can help AVR 
programs to correctly define attainable objectives. 
 
Performance Reports 
To ascertain the execution of both strategic and performance plans, required by 
GPRA, performance reports are to be published. The performance report is 
required to accomplish the following: 
• “review the success of achieving the performance goals of the fiscal year; 
• evaluate the performance plan for the current fiscal year relative to the 
performance achieved toward the performance goals in the fiscal year 
covered by the report; 
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• explain and describe, where a performance goal has not been met 
(including when a program activity's performance is determined not to 
have met the criteria of a successful program activity or a corresponding 
level of achievement if another alternative form is used) 
– why the goal was not met; 
– those plans and schedules for achieving the established 
performance goal; and 
– if the performance goal is impractical or infeasible, why that is the 
case and what action is recommended; 
• describe the use and assess the effectiveness in achieving performance 
goals of any waiver  
• include the summary findings of those program evaluations completed 
during the fiscal year covered by the report” (U.S. Congress 103-62) 
 
Performance reports can be instrumental in evaluating the success of an AVR 
program. An AVR performance plan would detail those actions applied correctly 
by an AVR and determine why any actions failed.  
 
The Government Performance Results Act of 1993 can be an essential 
evaluation tool when applied to an AVR program. GPRA requires that an agency 
clearly define strategic goals and objectives prior to a plan’s implementation. 
Clearly defined objectives are elusive in some AVR programs. As well, GPRA 
was not applied to the 2009 U.S. CARS program for reasons unknown. Though, 
not all AVR programs transpire domestically, the U.S. GPRA provides a template 
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for determining an efficient course of action that accounts for varying outcomes, 




SYNTHESIS OF LITERATURE 
Planners and policymakers are tasked with reducing environmental and 
economic consequences that stem from a society travel-dependent on motor 
vehicles. An often-implemented solution to correct ills generated by older 
vehicles still in operation is Accelerated Vehicle Retirement (AVR). Over fifty 
domestic and international AVR programs have been executed since 1990, 
including the 2009 U.S. CARS program, the largest such program to date.  
 
Economic and environmental theories abound concerning how to most 
effectively conduct an AVR program. The advantages and detriments of an AVR 
scheme have direct effects on consumers as well as the economy and 
environment as a whole. A sizeable catalogue of past AVR programs exists as 
an instrument for framing an effective AVR policy. As well the Government 
Performance Act of 1993 provides a template for monitoring a program’s 
efficacy prior to and throughout AVR implementation. 
Vehicle retirement programs can expeditiously modify entire vehicle fleets for 
both environmental and economic purposes. However, objectives vary across 
vehicle retirement programs. AVR implementation has occurred on diverse 
national and urban scales, backed with various motivations. Design of AVR 
programs has not been methodical. As evaluation is an essential part of 
government planning, given the lack of an accepted framework for AVR 
program design, this research has considered how various AVR objectives 
might be characterized to aid in developing a framework for future AVR 
programs. This research will attempt to answer the following research questions: 
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• What categorizations can be made concerning articulated objectives of 
past accelerated vehicle retirement programs 
• How can characterizations of the objectives and outcomes of past 
Accelerated Vehicle Retirements programs be use to formulate an 
implementation criteria that addresses both economic expectations and 
also environmental regulation at varying civic scales? 
• What performance measures would ensure that an Accelerated Vehicle 






Accelerated Vehicle Retirement (AVR) programs have been implemented as a 
means to removing a large number of older vehicles, which produce an 
excessive amount of vehicle emissions, from the vehicle fleet. Over fifty AVR 
programs have taken place since 1990. Vehicle scrappage programs place 
varying levels of emphasis on factors affecting program performance and 
articulated objectives, which results in varying outcomes. While design of an 
AVR program is a product of intended objective, commonalities exist between 
programs. In order to create a framework for designing an accelerated vehicle 
retirement program multiple methods are required.   
 
Content Analysis 
To determine what categorizations can be made concerning articulated 
objectives of past accelerated vehicle retirement programs, data was obtained 
from a number of resources. Content analysis was utilized to mine the data for 
the following: 
• Order and type of articulated objective 
• Program performance 
• Scale of program, and 
• Factors affecting program performance 
 
The data was compiled in an Excel document. Content analysis was then 
performed on the collected data to identify patterns in programs’ specified 
objectives. The analysis provided a way to characterize specified objectives, 
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determine scale, and enumerate program outcomes. Furthermore, content 
analysis afforded a method to categorize stated program goals for various 
programs as a means of characterizing major themes across programs. While 
each program exhibited a primary goal, many programs presented secondary 
goals. Several programs revealed tertiary goals. From this analysis a framework 
was constructed for AVR based on categorizations of articulated objectives. 
 
Population 
Seventy-five past AVR programs were identified through the literature review. 
This comprehensive population is warranted to ascertain impacts of scale, as 
the programs took place in varying localities. To capture a wide range of 
program structures, initially the population was not further narrowed. Due to time 
constraints and issues with data availability, once a more general analysis of all 
75 programs was complete a smaller group samples were utilized to provide a 
more in-depth analysis of AVR.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
Once characterizations of past AVR programs were made, statistical analysis 
was performed on the data to determine correlations and dependencies among 
program variables. Statistical analysis was performed using the following 
variables:  
• Monetary (interval-ratio) 
• Minimum and Maximum Participant Incentive (interval-ratio) 
• Total Program Investment (interval-ratio) 
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• Number of Vehicles Retired (interval-ratio) 
• Program Duration (interval-ratio) 
• Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement (interval-ratio) 
• Spatial Scale of Implementation (ordinal,) and 
• Order and Type of Objective (nominal) 
 
Hypothesis testing techniques applied to the identified variables included t-
testing, Pearson’s R correlation tests, and chi-squared tests related to program 
objectives. Once t-test and chi-squared tests were preformed across all 75 
programs, a framework was devised based on the analysis.  
 
Environmental Scrutiny 
As there remains discrepancy over the cost of a carbon per ton across various 
nations, scientific communities, and research, a more general approach was 
taken to examine the environmental benefit/detriment of AVR programs. This 
examination involved taking various factors affecting program performance and 
testing those against program’s that provided data for the total emissions (tons) 
reduction. Though air quality is impacted by a number of other factors including 
both stationary sources and also climate, the examination allowed for a general 






Once content analysis, statistical analysis, and environmental inquiries were 
complete, a framework for AVR was constructed utilizing the Government 
Performance and Results Act. Utilizing GPRA criteria as a template for an AVR 
framework helped to determine how it might endure under performance 
monitoring stipulations. In developing the framework, selected objectives were 
looked at in conjunction with accompanying factors affecting program 
performance.  
 
A mixed methodology of content and statistical analysis served to yield the most 
in-depth analysis possible, within time and economic constraints, for a large 
population of identified programs.  The methodology also allowed programs that 
lacked data for a given variable used in one analysis, to be included in an 





Data analysis reveals much about the structure of past Accelerated Vehicle 
Retirement (AVR) programs. By means of two distinct methods of research 
(content analysis and statistical analysis,) the data was combined to formulate a 
framework for future AVR programs. A number of tables are used at the outset of 
the analysis as a means of grouping components of past programs, and to 
provide a previously unavailable conglomeration of past program data.   
 
Programs 
AVR programs have been utilized in various locations for the purpose of 
attaining a number of goals since the early 1990s. At least seven such programs 
were introduced in California beginning in 1990, along with others in Delaware, 
Colorado, Illinois, Texas, and Maine. European Union (EU) countries made use 
of AVR programs throughout the mid-1990s. Deluges of new programs were 
employed globally in years 2009 and 2010, coinciding with the global economic 
recession.  
 
Seventy-five past AVR programs were identified by means of content analysis of 
past program implementation document, legal statutes, and past reviews and 
research of completed AVR programs. As there is no current clearinghouse for 
information on past AVR programs, this research will serve as a database for 
future research. Throughout the data collection and content analysis process, 
Google translator was employed in order to appraise documents that were in 
 
 76 
languages other than English. As well, currency converters were employed to 
convert foreign currencies to U.S. dollars in order to aid the evaluation process. 
 
Program Subgroups 
Attributable to inconsistencies in the way data was recorded throughout 
assorted waves of AVR implementations, it was prudent to categorize AVR 
programs into several subgroups including:  
• Group 1:  National Programs (2009 – 2010) 
• Group 2: California Programs (1990 – 2010) 
• Group 3:  U.S. State-Based Programs (1992 – 2010) 
• Group 4: Canadian Programs (1996 – 2002), and 
• Group 5: National Programs (1992 – 2000)  
 








































23 United Kingdom 





Table 12: Group 2 California Programs (1990 – 2010) 
 Program 
1 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP) 
2 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II) 
3 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III) 
4 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV) 
5 Old Car buyback program 
6 Old Car buyback program 
7 Old Car buyback program 
8 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program 
9 Consumer Assistance Program 
10 Consumer Assistance Program 
11 Consumer Assistance Program 
12 Consumer Assistance Program 
13 Consumer Assistance Program 
14 Consumer Assistance Program 
15 Consumer Assistance Program 
16 REMOVE Program Phase I 
17 REMOVE Program Phase II 
18 REMOVE Program Phase III 
19 REMOVE Program Phase IV 
20 REMOVE Program Phase V 
21 REMOVE Program Phase VI 
22 REMOVE Program Phase VII 
23 REMOVE Program Phase VIII 
24 Vehicle Buy-Back Program 
25 Vehicle Buy-Back Program 
26 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback  
27 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback  
28 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback  
29 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS) 







Table 13: Group 3 U.S. State-Based Programs (1992 – 2010) 
 Program Location  
1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program Delaware 
2 Total Clean Cars Program  Denver, CO 
3 Illinois EPA Chicago, IL 
4 Drive a Clean Machine Texas* 




Table 14: Group 4 Canadian Programs (1996 – 2002) 
 
Program Location 
1 Scrap-It Pilot Program British Columbia 
2 Scrap-It Program British Columbia 

























Scale of Implementation 
The scale of past AVR programs can be categorized by means of three distinct 
measures: spatial, monetary, and outcome. The only ordinal variable in the 
group, spatial scale, applies to the level of population where a given AVR 
program was executed. Monetary scale yields three interval-ratio categories: 
amount of investment, low incentive amount, and high incentive amount. 
Incentive amount produced two categorizations, as often there were ranges of 
incentive amounts to be earned (i.e. the U.S. CARS program offered incentives 
between $3,500 and $4,500 U.S. dollars.) Finally, scale of program outcome 
related to the total number of vehicles retired in a given program.  
 
Spatial Scale 





1 Austria 8214160 13 Luxembourg 497538 
2 Canada 33759742 14 The Netherlands 16783092 
3 Cyprus 1102677 15 Portugal 10735765 
4 Cyprus 1102677 16 Portugal 10735765 
5 France 64768389 17 Romania 21959278 
6 France 64768389 18 Russia 139390205 
7 France 64768389 19 Slovakia 5470306 
8 Germany 82282988 20 Slovakia 5470306 
9 Greece 10749943 21 Spain 46505963 
10 Italy 58090681 22 Spain 46505963 
11 Ireland 4622917 23 United Kingdom 62348447 
12 Japan 126804433 24 United States 310232863 





Table 17: Spatial Scale Group 2 
 
Program  Population 
1 
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program 
(SCRAP) 8,863,000 
2 
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program 
(SCRAP II) 9,208,100 
3 
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program 
(SCRAP III) 9,280,600 
4 
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program 
(SCRAP IV) 9,327,300 
5 Old Car buyback program 386,108 (1996) 
6 Old Car buyback program 401,690 (2001) 
7 Old Car buyback program 402,025 (2009) 
8 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program 9,437,290 (1999) 
9 Consumer Assistance Program 34,507,030 (2001) 
10 Consumer Assistance Program 34,507,030 (2001) 
11 Consumer Assistance Program 35,885,415 (2005) 
12 Consumer Assistance Program 36,377,534 (2007) 
13 Consumer Assistance Program 36,756,666 (2008) 
14 Consumer Assistance Program 36,961,664 (2009) 
15 Consumer Assistance Program 36,961,664 (2009) 
16 REMOVE Program Phase I 3,326,552 (2000) 
17 REMOVE Program Phase II 3,326,552 (2000) 
18 REMOVE Program Phase III 3,326,552 (2000) 
19 REMOVE Program Phase IV 3,326,552 (2000) 
20 REMOVE Program Phase V 3,326,552 (2000) 
21 REMOVE Program Phase VI 3,326,552 (2000) 
22 REMOVE Program Phase VII 3,326,552 (2000) 
23 REMOVE Program Phase VIII 3,326,552 (2000) 
24 Vehicle Buy-Back Program 3,326,552 (2000) 
25 Vehicle Buy-Back Program 3,326,552 (2000) 
26 
Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle 
buyback program 7,014,896 (2005) 
27 
Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle 
buyback program 7,427,757 (2009) 
28 
Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle 
buyback program 7,427,757 (2009) 
29 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS) 16,800,000 
30 Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program 265, 297(July 2008) 
(See Appendix A for citations) 
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Table 18: Spatial Scale Group 3 
 
Program Population (2009) 
1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program 863,832 
2 Total Clean Cars Program  582,447 
3 Illinois EPA 2,824,064 
4 Drive a Clean Machine 6,002,550* 
5 High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program 1,274,923 
*Dallas-Ft. Worth, Austin-Round Rock, and Houston-Galveston-Brazoria Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
(See Appendix A for citations) 
 
Table 19: Spatial Scale Group 4 
 
Program Population 
1 Scrap-It Pilot Program 4011375 (1999) 
2 Scrap-It 4530960 (2010) 
3 Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project 1022000 (2000) 
(See Appendix A for citations) 
 
Table 20: Spatial Scale Group 5 
 
Country Population (July 2010 est.) 
1 Denmark 5,515,575 
2 France 64,768,389 
3 France 64,768,389 
4 France 64,768,389 
5 Greece 10,749,943 
6 Hungary 9,992,339 
7 Spain 46,505,963 
8 Spain 46,505,963 
9 Ireland 4,622,917 
10 Norway 4,676,305 
11 Italy 58,090,681 
12 Italy 58,090,681 
13 Argentina 41,343,201 




A program’s monetary scale can be itemized as one of 3 distinct classifications. 
Classifications include: the total dollar amount invested in a program, a 
program’s minimum incentive offered to participants, and the maximum 
incentive offered to program participants. Design of past AVR programs often 
dictated a range of incentive amounts available to participants. For 
categorization purposes the amounts were grouped as minimum and maximum. 
When only one incentive amount was known, the figure was labeled as the 
“maximum” incentive available. Throughout tables 21- 25, blank shaded boxes 
denote unknown investment and incentive amounts. For group 5, only one 
program, Hungary, had a known investment amount. All values have been 




Table 21: Monetary Scale Group 1 
 
Program Investment Minimum Incentive Maximum Incentive 
1 Austria   61,130,257.0  2037.00 
2 Canada  93,216,474.9  303.90 
3 Cyprus 11,546,826.0 349.00 2322.00 
4 Cyprus 2,716,900.30  2400.00 
5 France 795,340,274.2  1358.00 
6 France 428,792,147.8*  950.00 
7 France 428,792,147.8*  679.00 
8 Germany  6,792,250,856.8   3396.00 
9 Greece No budget 679.00 2988.00 
10 Italy  1,600,000,000.00  2037.00 9509.00 
11 Ireland 2590800 **  2037.00 
12 Japan  4,500,942,655.00   3041.00 
13 Luxembourg  13,584,501.00  2037.00 2377.00 
14 The Netherlands 169,806,271.40 1000.00 2330.00 
15 Portugal  30,565,128.85***  1698.00 2037.00 
16 Portugal  30,565,128.85***  1358.00 1698.00 
17 Romania  229,578,078.90   1212.00 
18 Russia  713,875,333.00   1699.00 
19 Slovakia  45,100,545.60  1358.00 2037.00 
20 Slovakia  30,021,748.70  1358.00 2716.00 
21 Spain  1,358,450,171.30   2,716**** 
22 Spain  328,344,000.00  679.00 2716.00 
23 United Kingdom  644,379,720.00   3221.00 
24 United States 3,200,000,000.00 3500.00 4500.00 
* France = 857,584,295.7 ÷ 2 (857584295.7 total dollars were allocated 
for both programs) 
** Ireland = 1,500  ! the number of vehicles scrapped (however, program 
was   largely revenue neutral as incentive amount was tied to a taxation 
decrease) 
*** Portugal = 61,130,257.70 ÷ 2 (61,130,257.70 total dollars were 
allocated for both programs.  
**** Interest free loan up to $13,300 




Table 22: Monetary Scale Group 2 
 
Program Investment Minimum Maximum 
1 
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program 
(SCRAP)  5,000,000   700 
2 
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program 
(SCRAP II)  775,000   700 
3 
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program 
(SCRAP III)    700 
4 
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program 
(SCRAP IV)    600 
5 Old Car buyback program  930,000   500 
6 Old Car buyback program  250,000   500 
7 Old Car buyback program  ~1,000,000  800 1000 
8 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program  1,000,000   500 
9 Consumer Assistance Program    450 
10 Consumer Assistance Program  38,000,000   1000 
11 Consumer Assistance Program    1000 
12 Consumer Assistance Program  21,000,000   1000 
13 Consumer Assistance Program  30,000,000   1000 
14 Consumer Assistance Program  41,000,000   1000 
15 Consumer Assistance Program  46,139,000   1000 
16 REMOVE Program Phase I  3,665,200  400 600 
17 REMOVE Program Phase II  4,773,814  400 600 
18 REMOVE Program Phase III  3,594,486  400 600 
19 REMOVE Program Phase IV  2,688,311  400 600 
20 REMOVE Program Phase V  5,309,952  400 600 
21 REMOVE Program Phase VI  2,556,403  400 600 
22 REMOVE Program Phase VII  2,422,741  400 600 
23 REMOVE Program Phase VIII  1,210,648  400 600 
24 Vehicle Buy-Back Program  1,000,000   500 
25 Vehicle Buy-Back Program  1,000,000   500 
26 
Bay Area Air Quality Management District 
vehicle buyback program  ~58,500,000*   500 
27 
Bay Area Air Quality Management District 
vehicle buyback program  ~13,000,000*   650 
28 
Bay Area Air Quality Management District 
vehicle buyback program  6,800,000   1000 
29 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS)  4,000,000   1000 
30 Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program 200,000  800 





Table 23: Monetary Scale Group 3 
 
Program Investment Minimum Maximum 
1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program      500  
2 Total Clean Cars Program   500,000.0  
 
 1,000  
3 Illinois EPA    647   902  
4 Drive a Clean Machine  133,753,331.2   3,000   3,500  
5 High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program  178,517.0   1,000   2,000  
(See Appendix A for citations) 
 
Table 24: Monetary Scale Group 4 
 
Program Investment Minimum Maximum 
1 Scrap-It Pilot Program   504 757 
2 Scrap-It   504* 1009* 
3 
Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot 
Project   
 
500** 
* $504 toward the purchase of a bicycle (50% of purchase price to 
maximum) 
$504 toward a 1988 or newer vehicle  
$756 toward 14 months of a 1-zone transit pass  
$757 toward a new vehicle  
$757 toward vanpooling 
 $780 toward 10 months of a 2-zone transit pass   
$824 toward 8 months of a 3-zone transit pass  
$1009 toward a new natural gas vehicle 
**12 free consecutive monthly transit passes ($504 value) 






















Table 25: Monetary Scale Group 5 
 
Country Investment Minimum Maximum 
1 Denmark   1184.12 
2 France   413 
3 France   1033 
4 France  1033 1446 
5 Greece      
6 Hungary 454,000 
 
 506.56 
7 Spain  692.97 814.55 
8 Spain  692.97 814.55 
9 Ireland   1610.40 
10 Norway   864 
11 Italy  1049 1399 
12 Italy  874 1049 
13 Argentina  520,946,723.97  996 4,482 




Scale of Outcome 
The number of vehicles retired in each program varied considerably. A number 
of variables that may have influenced fluctuations of a program’s direct outcome 
will be discussed throughout the analysis. Tables 26 thru 31 detail the scale of 
results for each program: 
 
Table 26: Scale of Outcome Group 1 
 
Country Number of Vehicles Retired 
1 Austria   30,000 
2 Canada  118,980 
3 Cyprus 10,039 
4 Cyprus 1,100 
5 France 600,000 
6 France 200,000 
7 France 300,000 
8 Germany 2,000,000 
9 Greece 70,000 
10 Italy 856,000 
11 Ireland 17,272 
12 Japan 748,000 
13 Luxembourg 52000 
14 The Netherlands 56,900 
15 Portugal 32,500 
16 Portugal 8,875 
17 Romania 190,000 
18 Russia 230,000 
19 Slovakia 22,100 
20 Slovakia 22,100 
21 Spain 260,000 
22 Spain 70,000 
23 United Kingdom 400,000 
24 United States 677, 842 













1 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP) 8367 
2 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II) 502 
3 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III) 335 
4 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV) 11167 
5 Old Car buyback program 1 1,200 
6 Old Car buyback program 2 350 
7 Old Car buyback program 3  1,400 
8 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program 1,001 
9 Consumer Assistance Program 1 7,000 
10 Consumer Assistance Program 2 34,003 
11 Consumer Assistance Program 3 ~4000 
12 Consumer Assistance Program 4 16,900 
13 Consumer Assistance Program 5 21,909 
14 Consumer Assistance Program 6 22,331 
15 Consumer Assistance Program 7 45,000 
16 REMOVE Program Phase I 
 17 REMOVE Program Phase II 
 18 REMOVE Program Phase III 
 19 REMOVE Program Phase IV 
 20 REMOVE Program Phase V 
 21 REMOVE Program Phase VI 
 22 REMOVE Program Phase VII 
 23 REMOVE Program Phase VIII 
 24 Vehicle Buy-Back Program ~2,100 
25 Vehicle Buy-Back Program ~2,100 
26 BAAQMD vehicle buyback  24,300 
27 BAAQMD vehicle buyback  5,400 
28 BAAQMD vehicle buyback  15,600 
29 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS) 370 
30 Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program 200 









Table 28: Scale of Outcome Group 3 
 
Program 
Number of  
Vehicles Retired 
1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program 125 
2 Total Clean Cars Program  271 
3 Illinois EPA 207 
4 Drive a Clean Machine 41,671 
5 High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program 62 




Table 29: Scale of Outcome Group 4 
 
Program Number of Vehicles Retired 
1 Scrap-It Pilot Program 1,000 
2 Scrap-It 25000 * 
3 Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project 600 
* As of 7/1/2010 




Table 30: Scale of Outcome Group 5 
 
Program 
Number of Vehicles 
Retired 
1 Denmark Unknown* 
2 France 
 3 France 750,000** 
4 France 750,000** 
5 Greece 59,540 
6 Hungary ~150,000 
7 Spain 211,000 
8 Spain 146,000 
9 Ireland 59540 
10 Norway 150,000 
11 Italy 1,148,000 
12 Italy 
 13 Argentina 103,532 
*100,000 in first 6 months, though program lasted nearly a year and a half. 
**1,500,000 for both programs 




Program duration was calculated by first finding the number of days between a 
program’s start and end date. The number of days between a program’s start 
and end date was then divided by 30.5 - the approximate average number of 
days in a given month. Duration values represent the approximate number of 
months of a program’s tenure. Several programs are ongoing and were 
analyzed based on program performance thus far. When a program was 
ongoing an end date of 3/1/2011 was used.  For an exact list of program dates, 


















Table 31: Program Duration Group 1 
!
Country Duration  (Months) 
1 Austria  8.23 
2 Canada 25.42 
3 Cyprus 7.84 
4 Cyprus 2.03 
5 France 12.65 
6 France 5.81 
7 France 5.90 
8 Germany 11.32 
9 Greece 1.06 
10 Italy 10.55 
11 Ireland 11.71 
12 Japan 9.19 
13 Luxembourg 8.13 
14 The Netherlands 18.74 
15 Portugal 7.00 
16 Portugal 4.70 
17 Romania 9.10 
18 Russia 9.60 
19 Slovakia 0.50 
20 Slovakia 8.70 
21 Spain 21.60 
22 Spain 11.60 
23 United Kingdom 10.80 
24 United States 1.70 




Table 32: Program Duration Group 2 
!
Program  Duration 
1 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP) 4.48 
2 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II) 
 3 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III) 
 4 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV) 
 5 Old Car buyback program 35.32 
6 Old Car buyback program 39.26 
7 Old Car buyback program 58.87 
8 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program 12.71 
9 Consumer Assistance Program 41.16 
10 Consumer Assistance Program 5.90 
11 Consumer Assistance Program 47.10 
12 Consumer Assistance Program 11.74 
13 Consumer Assistance Program 11.74 
14 Consumer Assistance Program 7.16 
15 Consumer Assistance Program 22.26 
16 REMOVE Program Phase I 11.77 
17 REMOVE Program Phase II 11.77 
18 REMOVE Program Phase III 11.77 
19 REMOVE Program Phase IV 11.77 
20 REMOVE Program Phase V 11.77 
21 REMOVE Program Phase VI 11.77 
22 REMOVE Program Phase VII 11.77 
23 REMOVE Program Phase VIII 11.77 
24 Vehicle Buy-Back Program 11.77 
25 Vehicle Buy-Back Program 11.77 
26 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback  171.81 
27 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback  116.94 
28 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback  35.32 
29 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS) 23.52 
30 Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program 22.55 





Table 33: Program Duration Group 3 
!
Program Duration 
1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program 12 
2 Total Clean Cars Program  0.5 
3 Illinois EPA 12 
4 Drive a Clean Machine 35.3 
5 High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program 11.1 
(See Appendix A for citations) 
 
Table 34: Program Duration Group 4 
!
Program Duration 
1 Scrap-It Pilot Program 332.38 
2 Scrap-It 142.58 
3 Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project 12.09 
(See Appendix A for citations) 
 
Table 35: Program Duration Group 5 
!
Program Duration 
1 Denmark 17.58 
2 France 
 3 France 16.58 
4 France 12.74 
5 Greece 26.45 
6 Hungary 4.94 
7 Spain 5.90 
8 Spain 6.84 
9 Ireland 35.16 
10 Norway 11.77 
11 Italy 8.77 
12 Italy 7.77 
13 Argentina 19.45 




Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement 
Past AVR programs stipulate that age of a vehicle must be at least a certain 
specified age in order to be eligible to participate in a given program. Minimum 
vehicle age values represent the minimum allowable age a of a vehicle to 
participate.  
 
Table 36: Minimum Vehicle Age Group 1 
!
Country Minimum Vehicle Age 
1 Austria  13.0 
2 Canada 15.0 
3 Cyprus 15.0 
4 Cyprus 15.0 
5 France 10.0 
6 France 10.0 
7 France 10.0 
8 Germany 9.0 
9 Greece 9.0 
10 Italy 9.0 
11 Ireland 10.0 
12 Japan 13.0 
13 Luxembourg 10.0 
14 The Netherlands 9.0 
15 Portugal 10.0 
16 Portugal 8.0 
17 Romania 13.0 
18 Russia 10.0 
19 Slovakia 10.0 
20 Slovakia 10.0 
21 Spain 10.0 
22 Spain 10.0 
23 United Kingdom 10.0 
24 United States 8 
(See Appendix A for citations 
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Table 37: Minimum Vehicle Age Group 2 
 
Program  Min. Vehicle Age 
1 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP) 18.0 
2 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II) 21.0 
3 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III) 22.0 
4 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV) 21.0 
5 Old Car buyback program 21.0 
6 Old Car buyback program 26.0 
7 Old Car buyback program 14.0 
8 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program 18.0 
9 Consumer Assistance Program Not Applicable* 
10 Consumer Assistance Program Not Applicable* 
11 Consumer Assistance Program Not Applicable* 
12 Consumer Assistance Program Not Applicable* 
13 Consumer Assistance Program Not Applicable* 
14 Consumer Assistance Program Not Applicable* 
15 Consumer Assistance Program Not Applicable* 
16 REMOVE Program Phase I 11.0 
17 REMOVE Program Phase II 12.0 
18 REMOVE Program Phase III 13.0 
19 REMOVE Program Phase IV 14.0 
20 REMOVE Program Phase V 15.0 
21 REMOVE Program Phase VI 16.0 
22 REMOVE Program Phase VII 17.0 
23 REMOVE Program Phase VIII 18.0 
24 Vehicle Buy-Back Program 19.0 
25 Vehicle Buy-Back Program 20.0 
26 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback  12.0 
27 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback  22.0 
28 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback  20.0 
29 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS) Not Applicable* 
30 Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program 19.0 
*Not a requirement, instead must fail smog check 





Table 38: Minimum Vehicle Age Group 3 
 
Program Minimum Vehicle Age 
1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program 12.0 
2 Total Clean Cars Program  12.0 
3 Illinois EPA 13.0 
4 Drive a Clean Machine 10.0 
5 High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program 13.0 
(See Appendix A for citations) 
 
Table 39: Minimum Vehicle Age Group 4 
 
Program Minimum Vehicle Age 
1 Scrap-It Pilot Program 9.0 
2 Scrap-It 4.0 
3 Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project 13.0 
(See Appendix A for citations) 
 
Table 40: Minimum Vehicle Age Group 5 
 
Program Minimum Vehicle Age 
1 Denmark 
 2 France 
 3 France 10.0 
4 France 8.0 
5 Greece 10.0 
6 Hungary Not applicable 
7 Spain 10.0 
8 Spain 7.0 
9 Ireland 10.0 
10 Norway 10.0 
11 Italy Not applicable 
12 Italy Not applicable 
13 Argentina 10.0 




Factors Affecting Program Performance 
Five factors affecting program performance are detailed in tables 6 - 20 
including:  
• Total Monetary Investment 
• Minimum Participant Incentive Amount 
• Maximum Participant Incentive Amount 
• Program Duration, and 
• Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement. 
 
As each factor can be measured at the interval-ratio level, statistical techniques 
were employed to determine correlations between variables. By means of 
calculating Pearson’s r, the coefficient of determination (r2,) and the slope 
between different variables, the analysis sought to answer three questions: Is 
there a relationship between the variables? How strong is the relationship? What 
is the direction of the relationship? Calculations are summarized for each 
variable across all groups in Tables 41-51 and by program subgroup in 
Appendix B. 
 
Pearson’s r, or the correlation coefficient, is a measure of the association 
between to interval-ratio variables and varies from 0.00 to ±1.00. A value of 0.00 
indicates no association. A value of ±1.00 would indicate a perfect positive or 
negative relationship. How closely a measure approaches the extremes can be 
described as “weak” or “strong.” The coefficient of determination can be 
interpreted as how much our x variable increases our facility to predict or 
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explain y. Finally, our calculated slope (b) indicates that for each unit change in 
x there is an increase or decrease of b units in y (Healey 2005 402-409). 
 
Because data available on factors affecting program performance is based on 
data from a random sample from all AVR programs, it is necessary to test our 
calculated r values for significance. For all inspections we assume: random 
sampling, an interval-ratio level of measurement, bivariate normal distributions, a 
linear relationship, homoscedasticity, and that our sampling distribution is 
normal. Our null hypothesis is that there is no linear association between the two 
variables in the population from which the sample was drawn. Our sampling 
distribution is a t distribution, with an Alpha of 0.05. After measures of 
association were calculated, each measure was then tested for significance.  
 
Interrogating the relationship between monetary factors can help determine 
whether or not the benefit of conducting a program was commensurate with the 
cost of a given program, in terms of the total cost and participant incentive 
amounts. Investigating the relationship between minimum vehicle age 
requirement and other factors can help to determine the appropriate vehicle age 
stipulation for future programs. Finally, exploring the relationship between 
program duration and other factors can help to determine the appropriate length 
of an AVR program. The following analysis scrutinizes each factor across all 
programs in order to gauge a program’s effectiveness. The relationship between 
two given variables will be analyzed one time. As our investigations progress, 




Number of Vehicles Retired 
Intuitively, all AVR programs endeavor to retire the maximum number of vehicles 
possible in a given location. The number of vehicles retired by a given program 
provides a window as to how various program variables effect program 
participation. The following analysis examines how the number of vehicles 
retired by a program is affected by that program’s total monetary investment, 
minimum and maximum participant incentive, length of duration, and minimum 
vehicle age requirement? 
 
Note that throughout the analysis our sample size N fluctuates as assorted 
factors affecting program performance are measured for association. Lack of 
data and inconsistencies in the way various programs recorded information are 
to be blamed for the fluctuation. Ideally, known past AVR programs would have 
provided consistent data in order to afford a must accurate analysis. In spite of 
this, analysis was consistent and sample sizes are annotated in each variable 
row
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Table 41: Correlation Summary - Number of Vehicles Retired 





% of variance 
explained by 























linear -0.2372 0.05628964 5.6 54 -47904.70 
(See Appendix A for included & excluded programs) 
 
 
Table 42: Signif icance Summary – Factors Affecting the Total Number of Vehicles Retired 










Minimum Vehicle Age 
Requirement 
t (critical) 2.015 2.086 1.996 2.001 2.006 
t (obtained) 17.051 1.411 6.053 !1.051" -1.761 
Statistical 
Significance to Total 
AVR Population 
! ! ! " " 





The number of vehicles retired by a given program can be affected by factors 
including:  the total monetary investment in a program, the minimum and 
maximum participant incentive amount offered by a program, a program’s 
duration, and the minimum vehicle age eligibility requirement stipulated by a 
program. While all factors were proven to affect program performance, even 
though program duration and minimum vehicle age requirement were related in 
the sample there is not enough evidence to conclude the variables are also 
related in the population, and may have occurred by chance alone.  
 
Total Monetary Investment 
The total amount of monetary investment in a program can affect a program’s 
performance. Greater investment should effect greater participation. The 
following analysis examines what impact a program’s total monetary investment 
has on the number of vehicles retired, the individual incentive amount offered, 
the length of a program, and a program’s minimum vehicle age requirement?  
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Table 43: Correlation Summary - Total Monetary Investment 




























-0.3125 0.0977 9.7 47 -89868429.5 
negatively linear 
(See Appendix A for included and excluded programs) 
!
Table 44: Signif icance Summary – Factors Affecting the Total Monetary Investment 








Minimum Vehicle Age 
Requirement 
t (critical) 2.086 2.066 2.0167 2.0141 
t (obtained) 4.021 3.716 -.0831 -2.206 
Statistical Significance to Total AVR 
Population ! ! " ! 




The total monetary investment in a given AVR program can be affected by 
factors including: the minimum and maximum participant incentive amount 
offered by a program, a program’s duration, and the minimum vehicle age 
eligibility requirement stipulated by a program. The total monetary investment in 
a given AVR program can affect the number of vehicles retired by program. 
Though program duration and total monetary investment were related in our 
sample, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the variables are also 
related in the population, and that our sample value may have occurred by 
chance alone. 
 
Minimum Incentive Amount 
The minimum incentive amount offered by a program can affect a program’s 
performance. Greater incentives, for minimum participation requirements, 
should effect greater participation. The following analysis examines what 
relationship exists between the minimum incentive amount offered by a 
program, the number of vehicles retired in a program, a program’s total 
monetary investment, the maximum incentive amount offered, the length of a 
program, and a program’s minimum vehicle age requirement? 
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Table 45: Correlation Summary - Minimum Incentive Amount 
















negatively linear -0.3562 .126898 12.6 29 -81.8553 
(See Appendix A for included and excluded programs) 
 
Table 46: Signif icance Summary – Factors Affecting the Minimum Incentive Amount 






Minimum Vehicle Age 
Requirement 
t (critical) 2.0452 2.0452 2.0518 
t (obtained) 3.352 -.8308 -1.980 
Statistical Significance to Total AVR 
Population ! " " 




The minimum incentive amount offered by an AVR program can be affected by 
factors including: the total monetary investment in a program, the maximum 
participant incentive amount offered by a program, a program’s duration, and 
the minimum vehicle age eligibility requirement stipulated by a program. The 
minimum incentive amount offered can affect the number of vehicles retired by 
program. While program duration and minimum vehicle age requirement were 
related to a program’s minimum incentive amount in the sample there is not 
sufficient evidence to believe that the variable are also related in the population, 
and our sample r value may have occurred by chance. 
 
Maximum Incentive Amount 
The maximum incentive amount offered by a program can affect program 
performance. Greater incentives, for fulfilling maximum participation 
requirements, should effect greater participation. The following analysis 
examines what relationship exists between the maximum incentive amount 
offered by a program, the number of vehicles retired in a program, a program’s 
total monetary investment, the minimum incentive amount offered, the length of 
a program, and a program’s minimum vehicle age requirement? 
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Table 47: Correlation Summary - Maximum Incentive Amount 














negatively linear -0.3562 .126898 12.6 29 -101.51 
(See Appendix A for included & excluded programs) 
 
Table 48: Signif icance Summary – Factors Affecting the Maximum Incentive Amount 
!"#"" !"# $%#
  Program Duration Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement 
t (critical) 1.9955 1.9983 
t (obtained) -.0538 -2.86902 
Statistical Significance to Total AVR Population ! " 
(See Appendix A for included & excluded programs)  
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Summary 
The maximum incentive amount offered by an AVR program can be affected by 
factors including: the total monetary investment in a program, the minimum 
participant incentive amount offered by a program, a program’s duration, and 
the minimum vehicle age eligibility requirement stipulated by a program. The 
maximum incentive amount offered can affect the number of vehicles retired by 
program. While program duration and the maximum incentive amount offered by 
a program were related in our sample, there is not sufficient evidence to 
conclude that the variables are also related in the population, and may have 
occurred by chance.  
 
Program Duration 
A program’s duration can affect program performance. The following analysis 
examines how the duration of a given program affects the number of vehicles 
retired, the total monetary investment, the individual incentive amount offered, 
and a program’s minimum vehicle age requirement? 
 
Table 1: Correlat ion Summary - Program Duration 
Variable Correlat ion  
Correlat ion 
Coeff icient 
Coeff icient of 
Determination % N Slope 




-0.3562 .126898 12.6 29 -81.8553 




Table 50: Signif icance Summary – Factors Affecting Program Duration 
!"#"" 65 
  
Minimum Vehicle Age 
Requirement 
t (critical) 1.9983 
t (obtained) -.4666 
Statistical Significance to Total AVR 
Population ! 
(See Appendix A for excluded programs) 
 
Summary 
A programs duration can be affected by factors including: the total monetary 
investment offered by a program, the minimum and maximum participant 
incentive amount offered by a program, and the minimum vehicle age eligibility 
requirement stipulated by a program. Program duration can affect the number of 
vehicles retired by a program. While program duration and minimum vehicle 
age requirement were related in our sample, there is not sufficient evidence to 
conclude that the variables are also related in the population, and may have 
occurred by chance.  
 
Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement 
A program’s minimum vehicle age requirement can affect program 
performance. The following analysis examines how the minimum vehicle age 
requirement stipulated by a given program affects the number of vehicles 
retired, the total monetary investment, the individual incentive amount offered, 




The relationship, and the significance of the relationship, between a programs 
minimum vehicle age requirement and its relationship to a programs 
performance and between other factors affecting program performance has 
been explained in the previous sections. The following section summarizes the 
relationships for six factors effecting program performance.  
 
Summary 
Correlations exist between the number of vehicles retied by an AVR program, an 
AVR program’s total monetary investment, the minimum and maximum incentive 
amount offered by a program, a program’s duration, and the minimum vehicle 
age requirement stipulated by a program. Our analysis details the strength and 
direction of the relationship of factors affecting program performance to the 
number of vehicles retired, and relationships among individual factors. We note 
that the monetary scale of a program is positively related to a program’s 
outcome. With greater investment and offered incentives, a greater number of 
vehicles will be retired.  
 
Both program duration and minimum vehicle age are negatively associated with 
program performance. While the two negatively associated factors appear to be 
not statistically relevant to the total population through our analysis, both factors 
represent a large portion of the total population. Qualitatively, we might explain 
the negative association between the length of a program’s duration and the 
number of vehicles retired by reflecting on the initial excitement surrounding the 
2009 U.S. CARS program. Though the program was extended once to 
accommodate willing participants, it retired almost 700,000 vehicles in a mere 
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two months. We can conjecture that the sense of urgency present during the 
program’s short duration might not have sustained for a much longer period of 
time.  We also see that as the minimum vehicle age requirement set by a 
program increases, the number of vehicles retired decreases. We Innately 
understand that vehicles wear with age, and thus a smaller amount of older 
vehicles than newer vehicles will always be present. Extending the minimum 
vehicle age requirement ensures that there are less cars available to participate.  
 
Table 51 relates interrelationships across AVR programs for six factors affecting 
program performance: 
 
Table 51: Correlation Matrix – Interrelat ionships for factors affecting program performance 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
















Retired 1.00 0.93 0.30 0.61 -0.03 -0.24 
2 Investment 0.93 1.00 0.67 0.46 -0.13 -0.31 
3 
Minimum 
Incentive  0.30 0.67 1.00 0.63 -0.15 -0.36 
4 
Maximum 
Incentive 0.61 0.46 0.63 1.00 -0.06 -0.34 
5 
Program 




Age  -0.24 -0.31 -0.36 -0.34 -0.06 1.00 
 
Other factors affecting program performance 
While various insights can be taken from correlations derived from data 
collected for this analysis, other outstanding factors can affect program 
performance. In light of the current global economic crisis, a trigger for the 
commencement of several programs included in this analysis, it is apparent that 
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economic cycles may play a roll in how well a program performs. How much of 
a role an economic cycle might play in an AVR program’s performance is 
outside the realm of this analysis. However, we can conclude that many of the 
program’s included in Group 1 would not have occurred were it not for an 
economic downswing.  
 
Existing auto ownership might also factor in whether or not an AVR program 
performs effectively. Consider a population where a majority of the residents 
utilize public transit or areas where strict emissions regulations dictate that 
residents will not keep vehicles past prime running condition, to understand this 
occurrence. Simply put, if great numbers of vehicles do not exist in an area 
where a program is conducted, program performance will suffer.  
 
Hand in hand with existing auto ownership are cultural factors. Again, these 
factors are outside the realm of this analysis, but we know that different cultures 
place different values on personal vehicles. Many cultures are auto averse, and 
seek other means of travel whenever possible. Other cultures view personal 
vehicles as a mark of prestige. Still others view the very cars likely eligible for an 
AVR program as “classics,” and decline participation in an AVR program, 
whereas other “green” cultures might readily participate. In personal 
conversations throughout this analysis, several people offered reservations 
about the ecological ramifications of retiring a “clunker” for a new vehicle. 
Mentioned in the literature review of this analysis, emissions are expended 
during automobile production. Reservations stem from the likelihood that an 
older, well-running vehicle might still produce fewer emissions than those 
incurred during vehicle production.   
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Finally, the availability of information about a program may also affect program 
performance. While the 2009 U.S. Cash-for-clunkers program received 
extensive initial coverage by the national news media, program details were 
opaque well after the program’s commencement. How a program markets itself 
to the general public may play a major role in choice of scores of participants, 
qualified or not, to travel to dealerships or other program locations. As well, we 
must assume that a sector of would-be program participants do not have 
internet access.  Websites such as www.cars.gov and www.retireyourride.ca 
provide a wealth of information, but are useless to participants without 
computers and/or internet access. Programs might alleviate this issue by 
capitalizing on traditional media sources. A final note about the availability of 
information deals with those participants with internet access. Through data 
collection, several websites were discovered to be user-unfriendly. Information 
about a program housed in a hard to navigate website is of little value to 




Identified past AVR programs proposed articulated objectives, toward which, a 
program’s implementation was intended to execute. Each of the seventy-five 
programs had at least one articulated objective. A number of the identified 
programs proposed a secondary objective in addition to the primary articulated 
objective. A handful of identified programs had tertiary objectives in addition to 
the primary and secondary objectives.  
 
Articulated objectives were categorized first by the order of objective (assuming 
emphasis) and again by objective type. Objective types can be broadly defined 
as those having to do with vehicle sales (economic,) those concerned with 
reducing air pollution (environmental,) and those interested in road safety 
(safety.) By and large the most recent (2009-2010) AVR programs have been 
primarily concerned with economic benefits that may occur as a result of an 
AVR program’s implementation. However, the primary objective of many state 
based programs, especially those in California, have historically centered on 
environmental concerns.  
 
Order of Objectives 
The order in which objectives were identified for a particular program assumes 
emphasis. Even though objectives were sometimes stated in ways that insinuate 
equality between objectives, our analysis assumes a ranking. (See NHTSA 2009 
p 2.: “The CARS program achieved the objectives set out by Congress to 
increase automotive sales and aid the environment.”) Ranking the objectives 
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provided a way to delineate primary, secondary, and tertiary objectives.  A 
breakdown of ranked identifiable objectives includes:  
• Sixty-eight of the seventy-five programs listed at least one objective 
• Only six of the seventy-five programs had no identifiable objective 
• Fifty-one programs listed a single “primary objective 
• Twenty-four programs listed a “secondary” objective in addition to the 
“primary” objective 
• Seven programs listed a “tertiary” objective 
 
Tables 52-56 detail the order of objectives from past AVR programs
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Table 52: Order of Objectives – Group 1 
 
Country Primary Objective  Secondary Objective  Tert iary Objective 
1 Austria Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce Pollutant Emissions   
2 Canada Reduce Pollutant Emissions     
3 Cyprus Road Safety Reduce Pollutant Emissions Stimulate Auto Industry 
4 Cyprus Road Safety Reduce Pollutant Emissions Stimulate Auto Industry 
5 France Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce Pollutant Emissions   
6 France Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce Pollutant Emissions   
7 France Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce Pollutant Emissions   
8 Germany Stimulate Auto Industry     
9 Greece Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce Pollutant Emissions   
10 Italy Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce Pollutant Emissions   
11 Ireland Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce Pollutant Emissions Road Safety 
12 Japan Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce Pollutant Emissions   
13 Luxembourg Reduce CO2 emissions Stimulate Auto Industry   
14 The Netherlands Reduce CO2 emissions Stimulate Auto Industry   
15 Portugal Reduce CO2 emissions Road Safety   
16 Portugal Reduce CO2 emissions Road Safety   
17 Romania Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce Pollutant Emissions   
18 Russia Stimulate Auto Industry     
19 Slovakia Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce Pollutant Emissions Road Safety 
20 Slovakia Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce Pollutant Emissions Road Safety 
21 Spain Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce CO2 Emissions Road Safety 
22 Spain Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce CO2 Emissions Road Safety 
23 United Kingdom Stimulate Auto Industry Road Safety   
24 United States Stimulate Auto Industry Reduce CO2 Emissions   




Table 53: Order of Objectives - Group 2 
 
Program Primary Objective 
 
Program Primary Objective 
1 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP) Generate MERC's* 16 REMOVE Program Phase I 
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
2 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II) Generate MERC's 17 REMOVE Program Phase II 
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
3 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III) Generate MERC's 18 REMOVE Program Phase III 
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
4 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV) Generate MERC's 19 REMOVE Program Phase IV 
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
5 Old Car buyback program Reduce Pollutant Emissions 20 REMOVE Program Phase V 
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
6 Old Car buyback program Reduce Pollutant Emissions 21 REMOVE Program Phase VI 
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
7 Old Car buyback program Reduce Pollutant Emissions 22 REMOVE Program Phase VII 
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
8 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program 
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 23 REMOVE Program Phase VIII 
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
9 Consumer Assistance Program Reduce Pollutant Emissions 24 Vehicle Buy-Back Program 
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
10 Consumer Assistance Program Reduce Pollutant Emissions 25 Vehicle Buy-Back Program 
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
11 Consumer Assistance Program Reduce Pollutant Emissions 26 
Bay Area Air Quality Management 
District vehicle buyback  
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
12 Consumer Assistance Program Reduce Pollutant Emissions 27 
Bay Area Air Quality Management 
District vehicle buyback  
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
13 Consumer Assistance Program Reduce Pollutant Emissions 28 
Bay Area Air Quality Management 
District vehicle buyback  
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
14 Consumer Assistance Program Reduce Pollutant Emissions 29 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS) 
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 
15 Consumer Assistance Program Reduce Pollutant Emissions 30 Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program  
Reduce Pollutant 
Emissions 





Table 54: Order of Objectives - Group 3 
 
Program Primary Objective 
1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program Offset increased HC Emissions 
2 Total Clean Cars Program  Reduce Pollutant Emissions 
3 Illinois EPA Reduce Criteria Pollutant Emissions 
4 Drive a Clean Machine Reduce Pollutant Emissions in Counties with Ground Level O-Zone 
5 High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program Reduce Pollutant Emissions 
(See Appendix A for Citations) 
 
Table 55: Order of Objectives - Group 4 
 
Program Primary Objective  Secondary Objective  
1 Scrap-It Pilot Program Reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
 2 Scrap-It Reduce greenhouse gas emissions   
3 Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project Reduce criteria air contaminants Reduce greenhouse gas emissions 










Table 56: Order of Objectives - Group 5 
1 Country Primary Objective  Secondary Objective  
2 Denmark Reduce HC and NO x emissions   
3 France Reduce Pollutant Emissions   
4 France Reduce Pollutant Emissions   
5 France Reduce Pollutant Emissions   
6 Greece Reduce Average Vehicle Age Improve Emission Technology embodied in Vehicle Fleet 
7 Hungary Eliminate old two-stroke engine vehicles Reduce criteria pollutant emissions 
8 Spain     
9 Spain     
10 Ireland     
11 Norway     
12 Italy     
13 Italy     
14 Argentina Stimulate Vehicle Sales  
(See Appendix A for citations) 
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Type of Objective 
Objectives listed by individual programs can be further broken down by 
objective type. Recent programs have focused primarily upon stimulating auto 
sales, with a secondary focus on reducing air pollution. Programs held at the 
state-level throughout the 1990’s concentrated primarily on environmental issues 
in accordance with an idea proposed in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
that stated entities could reduce emissions in one area of an AQMD, if the total 
emissions reduction remedied high pollution in another area (Washington 1993 
1). A handful of European programs have centered on country specific 
tribulations such as road safety (Cyprus) and the elimination of two-stroke 
engines (Hungary.) 
 
Objectives were categorized first by order of objective, and secondly by 
objective type. Tables 57-61detail type of objective by program:  
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Table 57: Objective Type - Group 1 
 
Country Primary Objective Type Secondary Objective Type Tert iary Objective Type 
1 Austria Economic Environmental   
2 Canada Environmental    
3 Cyprus Other Environmental  Economic 
4 Cyprus Other Environmental  Economic 
5 France Economic Environmental   
6 France Economic Environmental   
7 France Economic Environmental   
8 Germany Economic   
9 Greece Economic Environmental   
10 Italy Economic Environmental   
11 Ireland Economic Environmental  Other 
12 Japan Economic Environmental   
13 Luxembourg Environmental Economic  
14 The Netherlands Environmental Economic  
15 Portugal Environmental Other  
16 Portugal Environmental Other  
17 Romania Economic Environmental  
18 Russia Economic   
19 Slovakia Economic Environmental  Other 
20 Slovakia Economic Environmental  Other 
21 Spain Economic Environmental  Other 
22 Spain Economic Environmental  Other 
23 United Kingdom Economic Other  
24 United States Economic Environmental  
(See Appendix A for Citations)  
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Table 58: Objective Type - Group 2 
 
Program Primary Objective Type 
1 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP) Environmental 
2 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II) Environmental 
3 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III) Environmental 
4 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV) Environmental 
5 Old Car buyback program Environmental 
6 Old Car buyback program Environmental 
7 Old Car buyback program Environmental 
8 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program Environmental 
9 Consumer Assistance Program Environmental 
10 Consumer Assistance Program Environmental 
11 Consumer Assistance Program Environmental 
12 Consumer Assistance Program Environmental 
13 Consumer Assistance Program Environmental 
14 Consumer Assistance Program Environmental 
15 Consumer Assistance Program Environmental 
16 REMOVE Program Phase I Environmental 
17 REMOVE Program Phase II Environmental 
18 REMOVE Program Phase III Environmental 
19 REMOVE Program Phase IV Environmental 
20 REMOVE Program Phase V Environmental 
21 REMOVE Program Phase VI Environmental 
22 REMOVE Program Phase VII Environmental 
23 REMOVE Program Phase VIII Environmental 
24 Vehicle Buy-Back Program Environmental 
25 Vehicle Buy-Back Program Environmental 
26 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback  Environmental 
27 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback  Environmental 
28 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback  Environmental 
29 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS) Environmental 
30 Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program  Environmental 
(See Appendix A for Citations) 




Table 59: Objective Type Group 3 
 
Program Primary Objective 
1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program Environmental 
2 Total Clean Cars Program  Environmental 
3 Illinois EPA Environmental 
4 Drive a Clean Machine Environmental 
5 High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program Environmental 
(See Appendix B for Citations) 
For all programs in Group 3 and no secondary or tertiary objectives were 
identified.  
 
Table 60: Objective Type Group 4 
 
Program Primary Objective  Secondary Objective  
1 Scrap-It Pilot Program Environmental 
 2 Scrap-It Environmental   
3 Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project Environmental Environmental 
(See Appendix A for Citations) 
No tertiary objectives were identified for programs in Group 4. 
 
Table 61: Objective Type Group 5 
 
Country Primary Objective  Secondary Objective  
1 Denmark Environmental   
2 France Environmental   
3 France Environmental   
4 France Environmental   
5 Greece Other Environmental 
6 Hungary Other Environmental 
7 Spain     
8 Spain     
9 Ireland     
10 Norway     
11 Italy     
13 Italy     
14 Argentina Economic  




Using Chi Square, objectives were assessed for independence against several 
program variables. For each model we assume independent random samples, a 
nominal level of measurement, and a null hypothesis that the two variables are 
independent. Appendix B. dictates those programs excluded from each test.  
 
Test 1: Type of Objective and Order of Objective 
Our first test was to determine if the order in which a program articulates its 
objectives is dependent on the type of objective. Objectives were categorized 
by type and by the order in which they were stated. 
 
Table 62: Type of Objective by Order of Objective of all AVR 
Programs 
 
  Order of Objective 
 Type of Objective Primary Secondary Tertiary Totals 
Economic 18 2 2 22 
Environmental 47 18 4 69 
Safety 2 2 5 9 
Other 2 1 0 3 
Totals 69 23 11 103 
 
Expected frequencies were then obtained for both variables:  
 





 Type of 
Objective Primary 
Secondar
y Tertiary Totals 
Economic 14.74 4.91 2.35 22 
Environmental 46.22 15.41 7.37 69 
Safety 6.03 2.01 0.96 9 
Other 2.01 0.67 0.32 3 




Sampling distribution = x2 distribution 
Alpha = 0.05 
Degrees of freedom = 6 




Our test statistic of 24.63 falls into the critical region and thus we reject the null 
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The pattern of cell 
frequencies in Table 62 is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The 
variables are dependent. Based on the data, the probability that the order in 
which an AVR program articulates its objectives is dependent on the type of 
objective articulated. Table 64 helps to make this relationship more obvious.  
 
Table 64: Percentages for Table 62 
 
  Order of Objective 
 Type of Objective Primary Secondary Tertiary Totals 
Economic 26.08% 8.69% 18.18% 21.35% 
Environmental 68.11% 78.26% 36.36% 66.90% 
Safety 2.89% 8.69% 45.45% 8.73% 
Other 2.89% 4.34% 0.00% 2.91% 
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The primary objective listed by a program is approximately 42% more likely to 
be an environmental objective rather than an economic objective. Whereas an 
economic objective is approximately 17% more likely to be the primary objective 
articulated by program rather than a secondary objective. According to these 
results, environmental objectives are more apt to be articulated as both primary 
and secondary objectives, while safety objectives are most likely to be a 
program’s articulated tertiary objective.  
 
 126 
Test 2: Program Performance by Order and Type of Objective 
The second test was to determine whether or not a program’s performance was 
dependent on the order and type of articulated objective. Program performance 
was ranked as low, average, and high based on the number of vehicles retired. 
Primary objectives were first tested against 59 programs that listed a primary 
objective.  
 
Table 65: AVR Program Performance by Primary Objective 
  
Primary Objective 
  Program Performance Economic Environmental Other Totals 
High 12 3 1 16 
Average 5 10 1 16 
Low 1 24 2 27 
Totals 18 37 4 59 
 
Expected frequencies were then obtained for both variables 
 
Table 66: Expected Frequencies for Table 65 
  
Primary Objective 
  Program Performance Economic Environmental Other Totals 
High 4.88 10.03 1.08 16 
Average 4.88 10.03 1.08 16 
Low 8.23 16.93 1.83 27 
Totals 18 37 4 59 
 
 
Sampling distribution = x2 distribution 
Alpha = 0.05 
Degrees of freedom = 4 
x2(critical) = 9.488 
x2(obtained) =24.65 
 
Our test statistic of 24.65 falls into the critical region and thus we reject the null 
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The pattern of cell 
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frequencies in Table 65 is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The 
variables are dependent. Based on the data, an AVR program’s performance is 
dependent on its stated primary objective. Table 67 helps to make this 
relationship more obvious.  
 
Table 67: Percentages for Table 65 
  
Primary Objective 
  Program Performance Economic Environmental Other Totals 
High 66.66 8.10 25 27.11 
Average 27.77 27.02 25 27.11 
Low 5.55 64.86 50 45.76 
Totals 100 100 100 100 
 
Approximately 67% of high performing programs articulate economic primary 
objectives vs. 8% of programs with environmental primary objectives. For 
average performing programs the type of primary objective does not seem to 
bear much concern. However, programs with the lowest performance only state 
an economic primary objective 5% of the time, insinuating that programs with 
economic primary objectives perform better than those with other primary 
objectives.  
 
Secondary objectives were then tested against 27 programs with an articulated 
secondary objective. 
 
Table 68: AVR Program Performance by Secondary Objective 
  
Secondary Objective 
  Program Performance Economic Environmental Other Totals 
High 0 9 1 10 
Average 2 5 2 9 
Low 2 4 2 8 




Expected frequencies were derived for both variables: 
 
Table 69: Expected Frequencies for Table 68 
  
Secondary Objective 
  Program Performance Economic Environmental Other Totals 
High 1.48 6.66 1.85 10 
Average 1.33 6 1.66 9 
Low 1.18 5.33 1.48 8 
Totals 4 18 5 27 
 
 
Sampling distribution = x2 distribution 
Alpha = 0.05 
Degrees of freedom = 4 
x2(critical) = 9.488 
x2(obtained) = 4.331666667 
 
Our test statistic of 4.331666667 falls out of the critical region and thus we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The observed 
frequencies are not significantly different from the frequencies we would expect 
to find if the variables were independent and only random chance were 
operating. Based on the results, an AVR program’s performance is not 
dependent on its stated secondary objective.  
 
Tertiary objectives were then tested against 7 programs with tertiary objectives. 
 
Table 70: Program Performance by Tertiary Objective 
  
Tertiary Objective 
  Program Performance Economic Environmental Other Totals 
High 0 0 1 1 
Average 0 0 3 3 
Low 2 0 1 3 




Expected frequencies were calculated for both variables 
 
Table 71: Expected Frequencies for Table 70 
  
Tertiary Objective 
  Program Performance Economic Environmental Other Totals 
High 0.28571428 0 0.714285714 1 
Average 0.85714285 0 2.142857143 3 
Low 0.85714285 0 2.142857143 3 
Totals 2 0 5 7 
 
 
Sampling distribution = x2 distribution 
Alpha = 0.05 
Degrees of freedom = 4 
x2(critical) = 9.488 
x2(obtained) = 3.733333333 
!
Our test statistic of 3.733333333 falls out of the critical region and thus we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The observed 
frequencies are not significantly different from the frequencies we would expect 
to find if the variables were independent and only random chance were 
operating. Based on the results, an AVR program’s performance is not 
dependent on its stated tertiary objective.  
 
Test 3: Total Program Investment and Objective Order and Type 
The third test was to determine whether or not the order and type of a program’s 
articulated objective was dependent on a program’s level of investment. 
Program investment was ranked as low, medium, and high based on the total 
investment. Primary objectives were first tested against 54 programs that listed 
a primary objective.  
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Table 72: Level of Program Investment by Primary Objective 
  
Primary Objective 
 Investment Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Low 1 15 2 18 
Medium 2 15 1 18 
High 14 4 0 18 
Totals 17 34 3 54 
 
Expected frequencies were calculated for both tables:  
 
Table 73: Expected Frequencies for Table 72 
 
  Primary objective 
 Investment Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Low 5.666666667 11.33333333 1 18 
Medium 5.666666667 11.33333333 1 18 
High 5.666666667 11.33333333 1 18 
Totals 17 34 3 54 
 
 
Sampling distribution = x2 distribution 
Alpha = 0.05 
Degrees of freedom = 4 
x2(critical) = 9.488 
x2(obtained) = 30.58823529!
 
Our test statistic of 30.58 falls into the critical region and thus we reject the null 
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The pattern of cell 
frequencies in Table 72 is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The 
variables are dependent. Based on the data, an AVR program’s level of 
investment is dependent on its stated primary objective. Table 74 helps to make 





Table 74: Percentages for Table 72 
 
  Primary objective 
 Investment Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Low 5.882352941 44.11764706 66.66666667 33.33333333 
Medium 11.76470588 44.11764706 33.33333333 33.33333333 
High 82.35294118 11.76470588 0 33.33333333 
Totals 100 100 100 100 
 
Approximately 82% of programs with a high level of investment articulate 
economic primary objectives vs. 11% of programs with environmental primary 
objectives. Conversely, programs with the lowest level of investment only state 
an economic primary objective approximately 6% of the time, insinuating that 
programs with economic primary objectives are more highly funded than those 
with other primary objectives.  
 
Secondary objectives were then tested against 21 programs with an articulated 
secondary objective. 
 
Table 75: Level of Program Investment by Secondary Objective 
 
  Secondary objective 
 Investment Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Low 0 3 0 3 
Medium 1 3 2 6 
High 1 10 1 12 
Totals 2 16 3 21 
 








Table 76: Expected Frequencies for Table 75 
 
  Secondary objective 
 Investment Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Low 0.285714286 2.285714286 0.428571429 3 
Medium 0.571428571 4.571428571 0.857142857 6 
High 1.142857143 9.142857143 1.714285714 12 
Totals 2 16 3 21 
 
 
Sampling distribution = x2 distribution 
Alpha = 0.05 
Degrees of freedom = 4 
x2(critical) = 9.488 
x2(obtained) = 3.71875 
!
Our test statistic of 3.71875 falls out of the critical region and thus we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The observed 
frequencies are not significantly different from the frequencies we would expect 
to find if the variables were independent and only random chance were 
operating. Based on the results, an AVR program’s level of investment is not 
dependent on its stated secondary objective.  
!
Tertiary objectives were then tested against 7 programs with tertiary objectives. 
As only 7 programs had data for both level of investment and tertiary objective, 
we can suspect from the outset that we will fail to reject our null hypothesis that 







Table 77: Level of Program Investment by Tertiary Objective 
 
  Tertiary Objective 
 Investment Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Low 1 0 1 2 
Medium 1 0 2 3 
High 0 0 2 2 
Totals 2 0 5 7 
 
Expected frequencies were calculated for both tables:  
 
Table 78: Expected Frequencies for Table 77 
 
  Tertiary Objective 
 Investment Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Low 0.571428571 0 1.428571429 2 
Medium 0.857142857 0 2.142857143 3 
High 0.571428571 0 1.428571429 2 
Totals 2 0 5 7 
 
 
Sampling distribution = x2 distribution 
Alpha = 0.05 
Degrees of freedom = 4 
x2(critical) = 9.488 
x2(obtained) = 1.283333333!
 
Our test statistic of 1.283333333 falls out of the critical region and thus we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The observed 
frequencies are not significantly different from the frequencies we would expect 
to find if the variables were independent and only random chance were 
operating. Based on the results, an AVR program’s level of investment is not 




Test 4: Region and Primary Program Objective 
The fourth test was to determine whether or not the primary articulated objective 
of a particular program was dependent on the region in which a program was 
conducted. Primary objectives were tested for 69 programs that listed a primary 
objective.  
 
Table 79: Region by Primary Objective 
 
  Primary Objective 
 Location Economic  Environmental Other Totals 
European 15 8 4 27 
North American 1 39 0 40 
Other 2 0 0 2 
Totals 18 47 4 69 
 
Expected frequencies were then calculated for both variables:  
 
Table 80: Expected Frequencies for Table 79 
 
  Primary Objective 
 Location Economic  Environmental Other Totals 
European 7.043478261 18.39130435 1.565217391 27 
North American 10.43478261 27.24637681 2.31884058 40 
Other 0.52173913 1.362318841 0.115942029 2 
Totals 18 47 4 69 
 
 
Sampling distribution = x2 distribution 
Alpha = 0.05 
Degrees of freedom = 4 
x2(critical) = 9.488 
x2(obtained) = 45.6230792 
 
Our test statistic of 45.63 falls into the critical region and thus we reject the null 
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The pattern of cell 
frequencies in Table 79 is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The 
 
 135 
variables are dependent. Based on the data, an AVR program’s stated primary 
objective is dependent on its location. Table 81 helps to make this relationship 
more obvious.  
 
Table 81: Percentages for Table 79 
 
  Primary Objective 
 Location Economic  Environmental Other Totals 
European 83.33333333 17.0212766 100 39.13043478 
North American 5.555555556 82.9787234 0 57.97101449 
Other 11.11111111 0 0 2.898550725 
Totals 100 100 100 100 
 
Approximately 83% of European programs articulate economic primary 
objectives vs. 17% of programs with environmental primary objectives. 
Conversely, North American programs state environmental primary objectives 
approximately 83% of the time vs. economic objectives stated as primary only 
about 5% of the time. Programs outside of Europe and North America are 
primarily concerned with economic objectives, while Europe houses the only 
countries concerned primarily with other objectives.  
 
Test 5: Level of Development and Primary Objective 
The fifth test was to determine whether or not a program’s primary articulated 
objective was dependent on a program’s level of development (population.) 







Table 82: Level of Development by Primary Objective 
 
  Primary Objective 
 Population Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Low 0 21 2 23 
Medium 6 15 2 23 
High 12 11 0 23 
Totals 18 47 4 69 
 
Expected frequencies were then calculated for both variables:  
 
Table 83: Expected Frequencies for Table 82 
 
  Primary Objective 
 Population Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Low 6 15.66666667 1.333333333 23 
Medium 6 15.66666667 1.333333333 23 
High 6 15.66666667 1.333333333 23 
Totals 18 47 4 69 
 
 
Sampling distribution = x2 distribution 
Alpha = 0.05 
Degrees of freedom = 4 
x2(critical) = 9.488 
x2(obtained) = 17.23404255 
 
Our test statistic of 17.23 falls into the critical region and thus we reject the null 
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The pattern of cell 
frequencies in Table 82 is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The 
variables are dependent. Based on the data, an AVR program’s stated primary 
objective is dependent on the level of development of the area in which it is 






Table 84: Percentages for Table 82 
 
  Primary Objective 
 Population Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Low 0 44.68085106 50 33.33333333 
Medium 33.33333333 31.91489362 50 33.33333333 
High 66.66666667 23.40425532 0 33.33333333 
Totals 100 100 100 100 
 
Approximately 66% of programs with a high level of development articulate 
economic primary objectives vs. 33% of programs with a medium level of 
development. Conversely, programs with a low level of development focus 
primarily on environmental objectives. While areas with low and medium levels 
of development seem concerned primarily with other objectives, the percentage 
is misleading as only 4 programs fell into this group.  
 
Test 6: Spatial Scale and Primary Objective 
The sixth and final chi square test was to determine whether or not a program’s 
primary articulated objective was dependent on a program’s spatial scale 
(country, county, city). Primary objectives were tested for 69 programs that 
listed a primary objective.  
 
Table 85: Spatial Scale by Primary Objective 
 
  Primary Objective 
 Spatial Scale Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Nation 18 9 4 31 
Region 0 14 0 14 
State 0 12 0 12 
County 0 5 0 5 
City 0 7 0 7 
Totals 18 47 4 69 
 




Table 86: Expected Frequencies for Table 85 
 
  Primary Objective 
 Spatial Scale Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Nation 8.086956522 21.11594203 1.797101449 31 
Region 3.652173913 9.536231884 0.811594203 14 
State 3.130434783 8.173913043 0.695652174 12 
County 1.304347826 3.405797101 0.289855072 5 
City 1.826086957 4.768115942 0.405797101 7 
Totals 18 47 4 69 
 
 
Sampling distribution = x2 distribution 
Alpha = 0.05 
Degrees of freedom = 10 
x2(critical) = 18.307 
x2(obtained) = 39.59094029!
 
Our test statistic of 39.59 falls into the critical region and thus we reject the null 
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The pattern of cell 
frequencies in Table 85 is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The 
variables are dependent. Based on the data, an AVR program’s stated primary 
objective is dependent on the spatial scale in which it is conducted. Table 82 
helps to make this relationship more obvious.  
 
Table 87: Percentages for Table 85 
 
  Primary Objective 
 Spatial Scale Economic Environmental Other Totals 
Nation 100 19.14893617 100 44.92753623 
Region 0 29.78723404 0 20.28985507 
State 0 25.53191489 0 17.39130435 
County 0 10.63829787 0 7.246376812 
City 0 14.89361702 0 10.14492754 
Totals 100 100 100 100 
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For this test we can see that only nations are apt to have economic and other 
primary objectives. The remaining five spatial scales only have primary 
environmental objectives. Regional scales account for 29% of those programs 
with primary environmental objectives, while less than 20% of national programs 
have a primary objective classified as “environmental.” 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Thirty-Eight programs with primary environmental objectives and 18 programs 
with primary economic objectives were looked at as part of this analysis. Each 
program varied in size and outcome. Simply, by observing the range for both 
programs we can see that programs with an economic primary objective are 
much larger than those with environmental primary objectives. Correspondingly, 
the standard deviation for programs with an economic primary objective is 
nearly three times that of programs with an environmental primary objective, 
even though there were approximately twice as many programs with an 
environmental primary objective.  
 
Table 88: Descriptive Table for Primary Objectives 




Mean 377,602.56 55,875.42 
Median 215,000 7,683.50 
Standard Deviation 472,258.01 165,361.2123 






Chi square tests were utilized to assess objectives for statistical significance 
against a host of variables including: type of objective by order of objective; 
program performance by primary, secondary, and tertiary objective; level of 
investment by primary, secondary, and tertiary objective; program region by 
primary objective; level of development (population) by primary objective; and 
spatial scale (nation, state, region, county, city) by primary objective. The tests 
confirmed whether or not the null hypothesis, that the variables are independent 
in the population, was true. In instances when the null hypothesis was rejected, 
we can conclude that the variables are dependent on one another. Calculated 
percentages allow us to see how independent variables affect dependent 
variables. Looking at program means and standard deviations, we can see 
clearly that programs with an economic focus were much larger than programs 
with an environmental focus. From our tests we learned that:  
• The order of an objective is dependent on the type of objective. 
• Program performance is dependent on the type of primary objective, but 
not the type of secondary or tertiary objective. 
• The level of investment in a program is dependent on the type of primary 
objective, but not the type of secondary or tertiary objective. 
• The type of primary objective articulated by a program is dependent on 
the region in which an AVR program is held.  
• The type of primary objective articulated by a program is dependent on 
the level of development (population) where a program is held, and  
• the type of primary objective articulated by a program is dependent on 
the scale (nation, region, state, county, city) where a program is held. 
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Importance of Stakeholders 
Though dependencies among objectives to various program variables have 
been uncovered in our analysis, it is important to note the importance of 
stakeholders and the role they might play in establishing program objectives. 
While it may now be obvious that program performance is dependent on the 
type of primary objective articulated by a program, it may not be obvious that a 
number of forces might influence the type of primary objective. As shown by the 
most recent wave of AVR programs aimed at generating economic stimulation, a 
host of political stakeholders may have a say in the type of objective articulated 
by a program. In the last wave of programs (2009-2010) we can assume that 
labor unions, automobile manufacturers, and political parties each had a hand 
in ensuring a program was aimed at an economic objective rather than an 
environmental. Additionally, we can assume that environmentalists and air 
quality management districts faced with poor air quality throughout California, 
had a hand in influencing a majority of California programs would be focused on 
the environment. 
 
Descriptive statistics show us that economic programs are much larger in scale 
and performance than environmental programs, a phenomenon that may deal 
with the speed in which a program’s reward is realized. The impact of a 
program aimed at stimulating the economy will be felt much sooner than that of 
a program focused on the environment. Environmental programs strive to realize 
results immediately, but also far in the future. Economic programs may have a 
more immediate effect on an economy. This short-term vs. long-term 
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perspective comes back to how willing stakeholders are to wait to see the 
objectives of an AVR program, designed under their reign, met.  
 
Ecological Impact 
Proponents and opponents alike cite the ecological impact of an AVR program 
as cause for conducting such a program. While the extent to which an AVR 
program harms or helps the environment could potentially, by itself, dictate how 
future programs are directed, available data on environmental impacts is scant. 
Nine programs provided data for both tons of emissions reduced and the 
number of vehicles retired. Another ten programs provided data for tons of 
emissions reduced, but not the number of vehicles retired. Based on the limited 
amount of records concerning AVR environmental aspects, the data was 
analyzed to determine the strength of relationship between ecological impacts 
and other variables.  
 
As each factor can be measured at the interval-ratio level, statistical techniques 
were employed to determine correlations between between the total emissions 
(tons) and other program variables. By means of calculating Pearson’s r, the 
coefficient of determination (r2,) and the slope between different variables, the 
analysis sought to answer three questions: Is there a relationship between the 
variables? How strong is the relationship? What is the direction of the 
relationship?  
 
Because data available on factors affecting program performance is based on 
data from a random sample from all AVR programs, it is necessary to test our 
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calculated r values for significance. For all inspections we assume: random 
sampling, an interval-ratio level of measurement, bivariate normal distributions, a 
linear relationship, homoscedasticity, and that our sampling distribution is 
normal. Our null hypothesis is that there is no linear association between the two 
variables in the population from which the sample was drawn. Our sampling 
distribution is a t distribution, with an Alpha of 0.05. After measures of 
association were calculated, each measure was then tested for significance.  
 
Caveats and Summary 
Calculations concerning correlations between different program variables and 
the ecological impact of a program were first conducted using all available data 
related to the total emissions (tons) reduced by a program. This was later 
amended because it was noted that a negative correlation existed between the 
minimum vehicle age requirement set by a program and the total emissions 
reduction. Intuitively we know that older cars generate the most emissions, and 
that raising the minimum age would thus realize a greater emissions reduction. 
Inspecting the numbers we realized that the number reported by the 2009 U.S. 
CARS program (336,608) was inordinately proportioned to all other program 
numbers.  The U.S. CARS program represented an outlier in the data, and in an 
attempt to normalize our calculations the program was deleted.  Table 89 details 










Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program 16 
High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS) 28.1 
Illinois EPA 51 
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II) 64 
Old Car buyback program (2006-2010) 66 
REMOVE Program Phase VI 104 
REMOVE Program Phase VIII 156 
Total Clean Cars Program  245.6 
Consumer Assistance Program (2001) 274.5 
REMOVE Program Phase VII 304 
REMOVE Program Phase IV 325 
Vehicle Buy-Back Program (1995- 1996) 325 
REMOVE Program Phase V 360 
REMOVE Program Phase I 400 
REMOVE Program Phase II 525 
Vehicle Buy-Back Program (1997 - 1998)  525 
REMOVE Program Phase III 590 
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP) 6400 
United States 336608 
 
Once the 2009 U.S. CARS program was removed, our issue with the minimum 
vehicle age was rectified. However, other correlations appear to have also 
shifted dramatically. For this reason calculations with and without the U.S. 
program have been included in this analysis:  
Table 90: Correlat ion Summary - Factors Affecting Program Environmental 
Performance (2009 U.S. CARS program included) 
















Reduction r value .99 .49 .97 -0.23 -0.49 
Statistical Significance 
to Total AVR 
Population 
! ! ! " ! 




Table 91: Correlat ion Summary - Factors Affecting Program Environmental 
Performance (2009 U.S. CARS program excluded) 
















Reduction r value .009 .13 -.05 -.27 .21 
Statistical Significance 
to Total AVR 
Population 
" ! ! " ! 
(See Appendix A for included Programs) 
 
One might note the drastic differences in tables 90 and 91. The 2009 U.S. CARS 
program, with an investment of 3.2 billion out performs the next highest invested 
program in our group by 3,162,000,000. As well the program retired nearly 
640,000 more vehicles than the next comparable program in the group.  
 
It would not be prudent to speculate about whether or not the U.S. CARS 
program is flawed. However, one can confidently state that it is drastically larger 
than other programs, and that though the programs are much smaller the 
number reported by the U.S. CARS program does not seem relative in 
comparison. Data about how emissions (tons) reduction numbers were tested 
and reported is not available. Transparency about how numbers are reported 
may solve this debate.  
 
We should also address the sheer lack of reporting on total emissions (tons) 
reductions across all programs. While many of the statutes found do require that 
a program report its emissions reduction data, the requirement has not been 
enforced. Not only is the reporting requirement not enforced, but also many of 
the programs that did report numbers in inconsistent manners. The most 
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appropriate direction for further ecological study of AVR programs is to ensure 
consistency in how emissions (tons) reduction numbers are reported.  
 
Finally, we must acknowledge that emissions (tons) reduction numbers are but 
one way environmental aspects of an AVR program might be tested. If accurate 
vehicle lifecycle cost analysis and/or smogcheck data over the lifetime of a 
vehicle were available, the numbers would perhaps present a more accurate 
way to calculate the environmental impact of removing vehicles from the road. In 
the past the price of a ton of carbon has been used to articulate how a program 
performs monetarily. The cost of carbon was not used in our analysis, as the 
number is almost always in flux. In summary, a host of environmental indicators 
exist with which to judge the performance of AVR programs, however their 
availability may complicate an analysis.  
 
The capacity to judge AVR program performance based on environmental 
indicators is problematic. Environmental indicators of program performance 
have not been recorded by a number of programs, due to the difficulty of 
obtaining such information and separate program objectives. By way of 
analyzing programs that did record such information, assumptions can be made 






Accelerated Vehicle Retirement programs identified for this analysis vary in 
scale and articulated objective. Program distinctions are significant and 
beneficial for understanding how and why given programs result in different 
levels of effectiveness. Though programs articulate a number of “primary” 
objectives, to that end a program will be most effective when it retires a 
maximum number of vehicles. Comparing factors affecting program 
performance across 75 programs can offer insight into how future AVR 
programs might be most effective.  
 
Through content and statistical analysis, we were able to extrapolate 
correlations among data from past programs and factors affecting program 
performance. Each of the factors: total monetary investment, minimum and 
maximum incentive amount offered to participants, program duration, and the 
minimum vehicle age required to participate affect program performance. It is 
essential to remain aware that the five factors are not wholly responsible for how 
a program performs, and that other factors such as current economic cycle, 
existing auto ownership, culture, and availability of information on a program 
may also play a role in a program’s performance.  
 
Additionally, statistical analysis exposed how dependencies among articulated 
program objectives and certain program attributes: performance, investment, 
population, location and spatial scale. Analyzing dependencies and factors 
affecting program performance provides a basis to develop a framework for 
future AVR programs.  
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Factors Affecting Program Performance 
Five factors were identified that affect program performance:  
• Total Monetary Investment 
• Minimum Participant Incentive Amount 
• Maximum Participant Incentive Amount 
• Program Duration, and 
• Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement. 
 
As AVR programs are implemented in the future, planners and government 
officials alike should note the relationships uncovered in this analysis in order to 
design the most effective program for their particular area. Litanies of 
relationships were exposed through our analysis. However, the ways in which 
each factor positively or negatively affects one another, and total program 
performance, can be summarized by the following:  
1. An increase in the total monetary investment in a program will increase 
the number of vehicles retired, minimum participant incentive, and 
maximum participant incentive. 
2. An increase in the minimum participant incentive for a program will 
increase the total number of vehicles retired, total monetary investment in 
a program, and maximum participant incentive. 
3. An increase in the maximum participant incentive for a program will 
increase the total number of vehicles retired, total monetary investment in 
a program, and the minimum participant incentive. 
4. An increase in program duration will decrease the total number of 
vehicles retired, the total monetary investment in a program, both the 
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minimum and maximum participant incentives for a program, and the 
minimum vehicle age requirement to participate in a program. 
5. An increase in the minimum vehicle age requirement for a program will 
decrease the number of vehicles retired, the total monetary investment in 
a program, both the minimum and maximum incentive amounts offered 
by a program, and a program’s duration.  
 
Impact of Objectives 
The objectives a program stipulates can shape a program’s performance. 
Program objectives were classified by order and type. The order of articulated 
objectives were categorized as: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Objective 
types were categorized as: economic, environmental, and “other.” Objectives 
categorized as “other” include road safety, reduction of the minimum vehicle 
age, and the elimination of two-stroke engines (Hungary.) The degree to which 
articulated objectives are dependent on program variables can be summarized 
by the following:  
1. The order of objectives articulated by an AVR program is dependent on 
the type of objective. An AVR program’s primary objective is 42% more 
likely to be an environmental objective than an economic objective. 
Economic objectives are 17% more likely to be a program’s primary 
objective, rather than a secondary objective. A program’s tertiary 
objective is likely to be an objective other than economic or 
environmental 45% of the time.  
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2. A program’s level of performance is dependent on type of primary 
objective. High performing programs stipulate primary economic 
objectives 66% of the time.  
3. A program’s level of performance is not dependent on its articulated 
secondary or tertiary objective.  
4. The level of investment in a program is dependent on a program’s 
primary objective. Eighty-two percent of programs with a high level of 
investment articulate primary economic objectives.  
5. The level of investment in a program is not dependent on articulated 
secondary or tertiary objectives.  
6. The type of objective articulated by a program is dependent on where a 
program is conducted. European programs articulate economic 
objectives 83% of the time, while North American programs stipulate 
environmental objectives 82% of the time.  
7. The type of objective stipulated by a program is dependent on the level 
of development in an area where an AVR program is conducted. Areas 
with high populations stipulate economic objectives 66% of the time, 
while areas with low populations stipulate economic objectives only 44% 
of the time.  
8. The type of objective stipulated by an AVR program is dependent on the 
governmental scale that conducts the program. Programs conducted at 
the national scale stipulate economic objectives 100% of the time, while 
programs conducted at the regional and state level stipulate 
environmental objectives 29% and 25% respectively.  
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9. The average number of vehicles retired is much larger (377,602.54) for 
programs with economic primary objectives than programs with 
environmental primary objectives (55,875.42). 
 
Ecological Impact 
How factors affecting program performance dictate how positively or negatively 
a program impacts the environment is a chief concern for planners that might 
design future programs. Five factors were tested against a ecological impact, 
including:  
• Number of Vehicles Retired 
• Total Monetary Investment 
• Maximum Participant Incentive 
• Program Duration, and 
• Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement 
 
Though past programs have not focused exclusively on how well they benefit 
or hurt the environment, an AVR program’s ability to affect total emission 
(tons) output in a given area is important for future programs. As knowledge 
and interest in global warming and how it is impacted by mobile emissions 
sources continues to rise, planners and policymakers may use AVR 
programs as a weapon to combat atmospheric deterioration. How factors 
affecting program performance effect the environment can be summarized 
by the following:  
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1. An increase in the number of vehicles retired will increase the total 
emissions (tons) reduction. 
2. An increase in the total monetary investment in a program will 
increase the total emissions (tons) reduction. 
3. An increase in the maximum participant incentive offered by a 
program will increase the total emissions (tons) reduction. 
4. An increase in a program’s duration will decrease the total emissions 
(tons) reduction. 
5. An increase in the minimum vehicle age requirement for a program 
will most likely increase the total emissions (tons) reduction. 
 
Summary 
Our analysis concludes that larger monetary investments (total program 
investment, minimum participant incentive, and maximum participant incentive) 
ensure greater program performance in terms of the number of vehicles retired 
and ecological impact. The benefit of an AVR program is commensurate with 
the cost of a program. Program performance is sensitive to the participant 
incentive amount offered, and is highest for those programs that offer higher 
incentives. Programs with longer durations and higher minimum vehicle age 
requirements will encounter diminished program performance.  
 
Objectives stipulated for AVR programs can motivate different levels of program 
performance. The highest performing programs are those that articulate primary 
economic objectives, and are also those programs with the greatest level of 
investment. As programs with higher levels of investment retire more vehicles, 
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our analysis of objectives is in line with our analysis of factors affecting program 
performance. Programs that primarily focus on stimulating vehicle sales 






In order to formulate a framework for future implementation of AVR schemes it is 
necessary to combine conclusions arrived at through analysis of past AVR 
programs. The framework provides guidance for structuring an AVR program, 
and for evaluating a program based on objective. AVR programs can be 
conducted at various spatial and governmental scales. No two AVR programs 
are exactly the same, and certain program variables will vary according to the 
size of the area in which an AVR program is conducted. Because no two AVR 
programs are the same, developing an all-encompassing framework for 
implementation could take several forms.  
 
One way to limit the number of forms a framework for AVR implementation might 
take is to utilize existing plan structures. The Government Performance Results 
Act of 1993 (GPRA,) detailed on page 69 is the most obvious and accessible 
template in which to base a framework for AVR implementation around. GPRA 
requires that federal government agencies formulate goals and performance 
monitoring plans for all proposed programs (Heen 2000 1). Under GPRA, 
agencies must also measure and report program outcomes (Heen 2000 1). 
Employing the GPRA template, a strategic and performance plan were created 
first for programs with an economic objective and secondly for programs with an 
environmental objective, based on findings throughout our analysis. Tables 92 - 
95 detail the four plans. 
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Table 92: Strategic Plan Framework for Economically Focused AVR Programs 




































































stipulation as primary 
program goal 
Research past AVR 
programs to show viability 
of such programs as 
economic motivators. 
 
Embark on intense, 
concise public relations 
campaign 
Economic downswings 
Lack of vehicle data 
Ability to reach all would-
be participants 
Number of vehicles 
retired 
 
Number of new vehicles 
purchased 
 














































Identify new vehicle 
models that align 





incentive scheme to 
entice customers to 
participate in 
program 
Converse with automobile 
manufactures about 
increasing the availability 








amounts adequate to lure 
maximum participation 
Lack of control over 
vehicle production 
 
Deficiency of inexpensive 
vehicle models that also 
meet set program criteria 
 
Shortage of funds 
available 







Table 93: Strategic Plan Framework for Environmentally Focused AVR Programs 















































illustrating the effects 
of driving an older 
vehicle vs. a new 





CO2 emissions prior 
to program initiation. 
Stipulate vehicle emissions 
reduction as primary 
program goal 
 
Research current in-use 
vehicle models and 
develop diagrams that 
show emissions output vs. 
new vehicle options 
 
Survey general public 
about perception of CO2 
emissions 3 months prior to 
program 
Public neglect of 
environmental concern 
 
Lack of vehicle data 
 
Amount of participation 
Number of vehicles retired 
 
Number of new vehicles 
purchased 
 





















































new vehicle models, 









Converse with automobile 
manufactures about most 
environmentally friendly 
vehicle options.  
 
Identify inexpensive vehicle 




amounts adequate to lure 
maximum participation 
Lack of environmentally 
friendly vehicle models 
 
Deficiency of inexpensive 
vehicle models 
 
Shortage of funds 
available 







Table 94: Performance Plan Framework for Economically Focused AVR Program 







































Establish Economic Stimulation as 
Primary Program Goal 
 
Greater Investment = Greater Program 
Performance 
 
Greater Incentive Amounts = Greater 
Program Performance 
 
Shorter Program Duration = Greater 
Program Performance 
 
Reduced Minimum Vehicle Age 







.000257 increase in 
vehicles retired per 
dollar invested. 
 
124.32 increase in 
the number of 
vehicles retired per 
dollar added to 
minimum incentive 
 
88.02 increase in the 
number of vehicles 
retired per dollar 








Amount = 804.31 
 
Maximum Incentive 
Amount = 1135.98 
 
Statistical Analysis 













Table 95: Performance Plan Framework for Environmentally Focused Program 
Goal Operational  Processes 
Performance  
Indicator 
Benchmark and basis  
for Comparison 






























 Establish Total Emissions (tons) 
reduction as Primary Program 
Goal 
 
Greatest Number of Vehicles 
Retired = Greatest Emissions 
(tons) reduction 
 
Greater Investment = Greater  
Emissions (tons) reduction 
 
Greater Incentive Amounts = 
Greater Emissions (tons) 
reduction 
 
Shorter Program Duration = 
Greater Emissions (tons) 
reduction 
 
Reduced Minimum Vehicle Age 
Requirement = Greater 
Emissions (tons) reduction 
 
Above Average Program 
Participation 
 
.49790 increase in 
emissions reduction per 
vehicle retired 
 
.000105 increase in 
emissions reduction per 
dollar invested. 
 
84.68 increase in in 
emissions reduction per 






Statistical Analysis found 
in Accelerated Vehicle 
Retirement: Toward a 
Conceptualized 




Implementation of an AVR framework based on the GPRA template and recommendations from this analysis can 
help to shape future AVR programs so that they attain both program objectives and maximum performance.
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Opportunities exist at all levels of planning for planners to formulate ways to 
cope with increasingly automobile – dependent populations. While long-term 
approaches such as mass-transit and congestion pricing should be scrutinized, 
short-term approaches must also be considered. Accelerated Vehicle 
Retirement offers a blunt instrument with which planners can affect rapid 
change. Because AVR programs typically require a sizeable initial investment, 
local level planning agencies have shied away from such programs. However, 
with proper program design and well-articulated objectives, AVR programs can 
be designed to affect economic and ecological change at a variety of 
governmental levels.  
 
Planning agencies house the research tools necessary to design AVR programs 
to fit their particular areas. A large pool of past programs can be scrutinized to 
determine how to best design an AVR program. Many local Air Quality 
Management Districts can provide a wealth of information about how AVR 
programs can work at a more local level. Implementing AVR programs at the 
local level can provide planners opportunities to meet stringent air quality 
attainment level set by the Clean Air Acts and generate an economic upsurge. 
The roles planners play in attaining air quality standards and economic 
development are important to communities of all sizes. Planners possess the 






This project contributes to the literature on AVR by providing a clearinghouse of 
data focused on AVR programs to date. By means of exposing relationships 
between various factors affecting program performance and program 
objectives, the project articulates the structure of how future programs might be 
designed. The project contributes to the professional field of planning by 
revealing actions planners can take to ensure future AVR programs are 
designed in such a way that articulated program goals are met. The analysis of 
factors affecting AVR performance will be useful to policymakers as they 
endeavor to regulate our current automobile-dependent society.  
Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research 
The research presented in this thesis is fluid, and will alter as AVR programs 
continue to be implemented. Like the surge of AVR programs that took place, 
more programs will likely take place as the world struggles to cope with a “new 
economy.” This project only considered factors affecting program performance 
and the objectives articulated by AVR programs; it did not consider the 
relationship of program performance to the total number of vehicles registered 
in a particular area, the true impact of automobile manufacturers on program 
performance, regional specific emissions standards for vehicles, or true political 
motivation behind program implementation. Because of time and financial 
constraints the framework designed in this analysis was not tested. In the future 
it will be important to not how the recommendations provided in this analysis 
transform as future AVR programs are completed. Throughout the analysis, 
language, currency, and familiarity with automobiles in foreign nations 
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presented barriers. Data mining often resulted in conflicting approximations, 
only to be confirmed much later. As well, the analysis most likely suffers from an 
American view of vehicle miles traveled, economic status, and environmental 
concern. Appealing avenues for future research include looking at AVR from a 
non-American perspective, juxtaposing the cost of AVR implementation to 





It can be inferred from our analysis that while great numbers of AVR programs 
have taken place in the past, a consistent framework for design and 
implementation has not been present. Had key relationships among program 
variables been published, a more consistent sample of AVR implementation 
would be available. Still, because of lack of recorded data for aspects in several 
programs, our assumptions cannot be generalized to all past AVR programs.  
 
The relationships uncovered in this analysis provide a framework with which 
planners can develop future AVR programs as a means of attaining a specified 
program goal. As the data contained in this project has not been collectively 
assembled till now, the project exists as a fountain for future researchers to drink 
from and as a guide for entities considering AVR implementation. AVR program 
performance is dependent on the type of objective set forth by a program’s 
managing agency. Programs are correlated with a host of variables affecting 
program performance. Planners and policymakers alike must develop systems 
to cope with the peripheral consequences of an auto-dependent society. One 
solution to ills resultant of a society depending on automobile travel is AVR. This 
analysis has provided an investigation of past AVR programs,  and a framework 















Appendix A. Table Citations and Excluded Programs 
Table 6  
ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Adda and Cooper, 2001; Arcemont, Gary, 2011; 
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Autoplus.fr, 2010; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 
1999; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay Area Air Quality 
Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; BIS, 2010; British Columbia Scrap-
It, 2010; California Air Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality 
Management District, 2009; California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; 
Canadiandriver.com, 2009; Cayting, 2011; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 
2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de Alina, 2009; Dill, 2001; Dutch Daily News, 
2009; ECMT, 1999; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; Hahn, 1995; IHS 
Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary 
Fund, 2010; Jacobs, 1990; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; PR Newswire 1993;  Retire 
Your Ride, 2011; Romania-Insider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; San Joaquin Valley 
Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution 
Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 
2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara 
County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution 
Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat, 2010; Smathers, 2011; Teskey, 
2010a; Sokol & Harmacy; Teskey, 2010b; Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality, 2011; Transport Canada, 2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 




Table 16  
Central Intelligence Agency, 2011 
Table 17 
California Department of Finance; Southern California Association of 
Governments, 2000; U.S. Census Bureau, 2011. 
Table 18 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 
Table 19 
Calgary Economic Development, 2011; Central Intelligence Agency, 2011; 
Ministry of Citizens' Services Government of British Columbia, 2011 
Table 20 
Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Central Intelligence Agency, 2011; 
Dill, 2001; ECMT, 1999 
Table 21 
ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Autoplus.fr, 2010; BIS, 2010; Canadiandriver.com, 
2009; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de 
Alina, 2009; Dutch Daily News, 2009; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; IHS 
Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary 
Fund, 2010; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; Retire Your Ride, 2011; Romania-
Insider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; Teskey, 2010a; Teskey, 2010b;  
Table 22 
Arcemont, Gary, 2011; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay 
Area Air Quality Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; California Air 
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Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality Management District, 2009; 
California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; Dill, 2001; Hahn, 1995; Jacobs, 1990; PR 
Newswire 1993; San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San 
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley 
Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution 
Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b; 
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat, 
2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 1999; Williams, J., 2010 
Table 23 
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Bearden, 1996; Cayting, 2011; Dill, 2001; 
Hahn, 1995; Smathers, 2011; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2011 
Table 24 
British Columbia Scrap-It, 2010; Sokol & Harmacy; Transport Canada, 2010 
Table 25 
Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 1999; Dill, 
2001; ECMT, 1999 
Table 26 
ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Autoplus.fr, 2010; BIS, 2010; Canadiandriver.com, 
2009; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de 
Alina, 2009; Dutch Daily News, 2009; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; IHS 
Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary 
Fund, 2010; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; Retire Your Ride, 2011; Romania-




Arcemont, Gary, 2011; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay 
Area Air Quality Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; California Air 
Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality Management District, 2009; 
California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; Dill, 2001; Hahn, 1995; Jacobs, 1990; PR 
Newswire 1993; San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San 
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley 
Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution 
Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b; 
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat, 
2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 1999; Williams, J., 2010 
Table 28 
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Bearden, 1996; Cayting, 2011; Dill, 2001; 
Hahn, 1995; Smathers, 2011; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2011 
Table 29 
British Columbia Scrap-It, 2010; Sokol & Harmacy; Transport Canada, 2010 
Table 30 
Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 1999; Dill, 
2001; ECMT, 1999 
Table 31 
ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Autoplus.fr, 2010; BIS, 2010; Canadiandriver.com, 
2009; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de 
Alina, 2009; Dutch Daily News, 2009; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; IHS 
Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary 
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Fund, 2010; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; Retire Your Ride, 2011; Romania-
Insider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; Teskey, 2010a; Teskey, 2010b;  
Table 32 
Arcemont, Gary, 2011; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay 
Area Air Quality Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; California Air 
Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality Management District, 2009; 
California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; Dill, 2001; Hahn, 1995; Jacobs, 1990; PR 
Newswire 1993; San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San 
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley 
Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution 
Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b; 
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat, 
2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 1999; Williams, J., 2010 
Table 33 
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Bearden, 1996; Cayting, 2011; Dill, 2001; 
Hahn, 1995; Smathers, 2011; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2011 
Table 34 
British Columbia Scrap-It, 2010; Sokol & Harmacy; Transport Canada, 2010 
Table 35 
Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 1999; Dill, 




ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Autoplus.fr, 2010; BIS, 2010; Canadiandriver.com, 
2009; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de 
Alina, 2009; Dutch Daily News, 2009; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; IHS 
Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary 
Fund, 2010; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; Retire Your Ride, 2011; Romania-
Insider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; Teskey, 2010a; Teskey, 2010b;  
Table 37 
Arcemont, Gary, 2011; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay 
Area Air Quality Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; California Air 
Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality Management District, 2009; 
California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; Dill, 2001; Hahn, 1995; Jacobs, 1990; PR 
Newswire 1993; San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San 
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley 
Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution 
Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b; 
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat, 
2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 1999; Williams, J., 2010 
Table 38 
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Bearden, 1996; Cayting, 2011; Dill, 2001; 
Hahn, 1995; Smathers, 2011; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2011 
Table 39 




Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 1999; Dill, 
2001; ECMT, 1999 
Table 41: 
Number of Vehicles Retired 
Excluded Programs – Total Monetary Investment: Greece, Unocal South Coast 
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto 
Program (SCRAP IV), Consumer Assistance Program 1, Consumer Assistance 
Program 3, REMOVE Program Phase I – IV, Delaware Vehicle Retirement 
Program, Illinois EPA, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It 
Pilot Program, Scrap-It, Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark, 
France, France, France, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy 
 
Included Programs – Minimum Participant Incentive: Cyprus 1, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, United 
States, Old Car buyback program, Illinois EPA, Drive a Clean Machine, High 
Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It Pilot Program, Scrap-It, 
France, Spain, Spain, Italy, Italy, Argentina 
 
Excluded Programs – Maximum Participant Incentive: REMOVE Program Phases 
I 




Excluded Programs – Program Duration: Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto 
Program (SCRAP II-IV), REMOVE Program Phases I – VIII, Denmark, France, 
Italy 
 
Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age: Consumer Assistance Program 
California Consumer Assistance Program (all years), REMOVE Program Phase I-
VIII, High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS), France, Hungary, Italy, Italy 
Table 42 
Number of Vehicles Retired 
Excluded Programs – Total Monetary Investment: Greece, Unocal South Coast 
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto 
Program (SCRAP IV), Consumer Assistance Program 1, Consumer Assistance 
Program 3, REMOVE Program Phase I – IV, Delaware Vehicle Retirement 
Program, Illinois EPA, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It 
Pilot Program, Scrap-It, Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark, 
France, France, France, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy 
 
Included Programs – Minimum Participant Incentive: Cyprus 1, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, United 
States, Old Car buyback program, Illinois EPA, Drive a Clean Machine, High 
Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It Pilot Program, Scrap-It, 
France, Spain, Spain, Italy, Italy, Argentina 
 
Excluded Programs – Maximum Participant Incentive: REMOVE Program Phase 




Excluded Programs – Program Duration: Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto 
Program (SCRAP II-IV), REMOVE Program Phases I – VIII, Denmark, France, 
Italy 
 
Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age: Consumer Assistance Program 
California Consumer Assistance Program (all years), REMOVE Program Phase I-
VIII, High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS), France, Hungary, Italy, Italy 
 
Table 43  
Total Monetary Investment 
Included Programs - Minimum Incentive: Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, United States, Old 
Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I, REMOVE Program Phase II, 
REMOVE Program Phase III, REMOVE Program Phase IV, REMOVE Program 
Phase V, REMOVE Program Phase VI, REMOVE Program Phase VII, REMOVE 
Program Phase VIII, Drive a Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement 
Pilot Program, Argentina 
 
Excluded Programs – Maximum Incentive: Greece, Unocal South Coast 
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto 
Program (SCRAP IV), Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance 
Program, Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Illinois EPA, Scrap-It Pilot 
Program, Scrap-It Program, Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark, 




Excluded Programs – Program Duration: Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto 
Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV), 
Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer 
Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance 
Program, Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Illinois EPA, Scrap-It Pilot 
Program, Scrap-It Program, Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark, 
France, France, France, Greece, Spain, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy, Old 
Car buyback program 
 
Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: Greece, Unocal 
South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled 
Auto Program (SCRAP IV), Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer 
Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance 
Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, 
Consumer Assistance Program, High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS), Delaware 
Vehicle Retirement Program, Illinois EPA, Scrap-It Pilot Program, Scrap-It, 
Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark, France, France, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Spain, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy 
 
Table 44 
Total Monetary Investment 
Included Programs - Minimum Incentive: Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, United States, Old 
Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I, REMOVE Program Phase II, 
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REMOVE Program Phase III, REMOVE Program Phase IV, REMOVE Program 
Phase V, REMOVE Program Phase VI, REMOVE Program Phase VII, REMOVE 
Program Phase VIII, Drive a Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement 
Pilot Program, Argentina 
 
Excluded Programs – Maximum Incentive: Greece, Unocal South Coast 
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto 
Program (SCRAP IV), Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance 
Program, Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Illinois EPA, Scrap-It Pilot 
Program, Scrap-It Program, Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark, 
France, France, France, Greece, Spain, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy 
 
Excluded Programs – Program Duration: Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto 
Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV), 
Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer 
Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance 
Program, Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Illinois EPA, Scrap-It Pilot 
Program, Scrap-It Program, Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark, 
France, France, France, Greece, Spain, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy, Old 
Car buyback program 
 
Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: Greece, Unocal 
South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled 
Auto Program (SCRAP IV), Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer 
Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance 
Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, 
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Consumer Assistance Program, High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS), Delaware 
Vehicle Retirement Program, Illinois EPA, Scrap-It Pilot Program, Scrap-It, 
Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark, France, France, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Spain, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy 
Table 45 
Minimum Incentive Amount 
Included Programs – Maximum Incentive Amount: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, 
United States, Old Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I- VIII, 
Illinois EPA, Drive a Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot 
Program, Scrap-It Pilot Program, Scrap-It, France, Spain, Spain, Italy, Italy, 
Argentina 
 
Included Programs – Program Duration: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, United States, 
Old Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I- VIII, Illinois EPA, Drive a 
Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It Pilot 
Program, Scrap-It, France, Spain, Spain, Italy, Italy, Argentina 
 
Included Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, United States, 
Old Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I- VIII, Illinois EPA, Drive a 
Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It Pilot 




Minimum Incentive Amount 
Included Programs – Maximum Incentive Amount: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, 
United States, Old Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I- VIII, 
Illinois EPA, Drive a Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot 
Program, Scrap-It Pilot Program, Scrap-It, France, Spain, Spain, Italy, Italy, 
Argentina 
 
Included Programs – Program Duration: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, United States, 
Old Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I- VIII, Illinois EPA, Drive a 
Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It Pilot 
Program, Scrap-It, France, Spain, Spain, Italy, Italy, Argentina 
 
Included Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, United States, 
Old Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I- VIII, Illinois EPA, Drive a 
Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It Pilot 
Program, Scrap-It, France, Spain, Spain, Argentina 
Table 47 
Maximum Incentive Amount 
Excluded Programs – Program Duration:  UNOCAL SCRAP II-IV, France and 
Greece (Group 5) 
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Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: California Consumer 
Assistance Programs 1-7, HEROS, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Italy 
Table 48 
Maximum Incentive Amount 
Excluded Programs – Program Duration:  UNOCAL SCRAP II-IV, France and 
Greece (Group 5) 
 
Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: California Consumer 




Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: UNOCAL SCRAP II-
IV, California Consumer Assistance Programs 1-7, Denmark, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Italy 
Table 50 
Excluded Programs - Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: UNOCAL SCRAP II-
IV, California Consumer Assistance Programs 1-7, Denmark, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Italy 
Table 52 
ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Autoplus.fr, 2010; BIS, 2010; Canadiandriver.com, 
2009; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de 
Alina, 2009; Dutch Daily News, 2009; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; IHS 
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Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary 
Fund, 2010; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; Retire Your Ride, 2011; Romania-
Insider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; Teskey, 2010a; Teskey, 2010b;  
2010b;  
Table 53 
Arcemont, Gary, 2011; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay 
Area Air Quality Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; California Air 
Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality Management District, 2009; 
California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; Dill, 2001; Hahn, 1995; Jacobs, 1990; PR 
Newswire 1993; San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San 
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley 
Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution 
Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b; 
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat, 
2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 1999; Williams, J., 2010 
Table 54 
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Bearden, 1996; Cayting, 2011; Dill, 2001; 
Hahn, 1995; Smathers, 2011; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2011 
Table 55 
British Columbia Scrap-It, 2010; Sokol & Harmacy; Transport Canada, 2010 
Table 56 
Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 1999; Dill, 




ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Autoplus.fr, 2010; BIS, 2010; Canadiandriver.com, 
2009; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de 
Alina, 2009; Dutch Daily News, 2009; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; IHS 
Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary 
Fund, 2010; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; Retire Your Ride, 2011; Romania-
Insider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; Teskey, 2010a; Teskey, 2010b;  
Table 58 
Arcemont, Gary, 2011; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay 
Area Air Quality Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; California Air 
Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality Management District, 2009; 
California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; Dill, 2001; Hahn, 1995; Jacobs, 1990; PR 
Newswire 1993; San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San 
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley 
Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution 
Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b; 
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat, 
2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 1999; Williams, J., 2010 
Table 59  
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Bearden, 1996; Cayting, 2011; Dill, 2001; 
Hahn, 1995; Smathers, 2011; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2011 
Table 60  




Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 1999; Dill, 
2001; ECMT, 1999 
Table 90 
Ecological Impact 
Included Programs – Number of Vehicles Retired: Unocal South Coast Recycled 
Auto Program (SCRAP), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP 
II), Old Car buyback program, Consumer Assistance Program, Vehicle Buy-
Back Program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS), 
Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Total Clean Cars Program, Illinois EPA, 
United States 
 
Included Programs – Total Monetary Investment 
Included Programs – Maximum Participant Incentive: Unocal South Coast 
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program 
(SCRAP II), Old Car buyback program, Consumer Assistance Program, Vehicle 
Buy-Back Program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, High Emitter or Scrap I 
(HEROS), Total Clean Cars Program, United States, REMOVE Program Phase I-
VIII 
 
Included Programs – Program Duration: Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto 
Program (SCRAP), Old Car buyback program, Consumer Assistance Program, 
Vehicle Buy-Back Program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, High Emitter or Scrap I 
(HEROS), Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Total Clean Cars Program, 




Include Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: Unocal South Coast 
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program 
(SCRAP II), Old Car buyback program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, Vehicle Buy-
Back Program, Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Total Clean Cars 
Program, Illinois EPA, United States, REMOVE Program Phase I-VIII 
Table 91 
Ecological Impact 
Included Programs – Number of Vehicles Retired: Unocal South Coast Recycled 
Auto Program (SCRAP), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP 
II), Old Car buyback program, Consumer Assistance Program, Vehicle Buy-
Back Program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS), 
Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Total Clean Cars Program, Illinois EPA 
 
 
Included Programs – Total Monetary Investment 
Included Programs – Maximum Participant Incentive: Unocal South Coast 
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program 
(SCRAP II), Old Car buyback program, Consumer Assistance Program, Vehicle 
Buy-Back Program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, High Emitter or Scrap I 
(HEROS), Total Clean Cars Program, REMOVE Program Phase I-VIII 
 
Included Programs – Program Duration: Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto 
Program (SCRAP), Old Car buyback program, Consumer Assistance Program, 
Vehicle Buy-Back Program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, High Emitter or Scrap I 
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(HEROS), Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Total Clean Cars Program, 
Illinois EPA, REMOVE Program Phase I - VIII 
 
Include Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: Unocal South Coast 
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program 
(SCRAP II), Old Car buyback program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, Vehicle Buy-
Back Program, Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Total Clean Cars 





Appendix B. Subgroup Analysis 
Number of Vehicles Retired 
How are the number of vehicles retired in a program affected by that program’s 
total monetary investment, offered individual incentive, length of duration, and 
minimum vehicle age requirement? 
Investment 
Insufficient data resulted in an inability to calculate correlations between the 
total amount invested in a program and the total number of vehicles retired for 
Groups 4 and 5. Table 94 details correlations for individual programs and total 
program investment. 
 
Table 96: Correlation Table: Total Investment and Number of 
Vehicles Retired 
Group Correlat ion Coeff icient 
Coeff icient of 
Determination % Slope 
Group 1: Worldwide 
Programs (2009 - 2010) 0.92420853 0.85416140 85% 0.000247302 
Group 2: California 
Programs (1990 - 2010) 0.88738871 0.78745873 78% 0.000625629 
Group 3: U.S. State-Based 
Programs (1992 - 2010) 0.99999741 0.99999483 99% 0.000311097 




When only one incentive amount was known, that data was categorized to be 
the maximum incentive amount. Therefore, the minimum incentive amount was 
known for very few programs. Insufficient data resulted in an inability to 
calculate correlations between a program’s minimum incentive and the total 
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number of vehicles retired for Groups 2 and 4. Table 95 details correlations for 
all programs 
Table 97: Correlation Table: Minimum Incentive and Number of 
Vehicles Retired 
Group Correlat ion Coeff icient 
Coeff icient of 
Determination % Slope 
Group 1: Worldwide 
Programs (2009 - 2010) 0.67915941 0.46125750 46% 232.624658 
Group 3: U.S. State-Based 
Programs (1992 - 2010) 0.98985433 0.97981160 98% 18.70691739 
Group 5: Worldwide 
Programs (1992 - 2000) 0.66402903 0.44093455 44% 1663.395474 
All Groups 0.30089911 0.090540273 9% 124.3298422 
 
Maximum Incentive 
The maximum incentive amount offered to program participants was located for 
all programs except the 1991 – 1993 Greek program. 
Table 98: Correlat ion Table: Maximum Incentive and Number of Vehicles Retired 
Group Correlation Coefficient 
Coefficient of 
Determination % Slope 
Group 1: Worldwide Programs 
(2009 - 2010) 0.42065868 0.17695372 17.7% 106.7 
Group 2: California Programs (1990 
- 2010) 0.45359418 0.20574768 20.6% 25.08 
Group 3: U.S. State-Based 
Programs (1992 - 2010) 0.88822989 0.78895234 78.9% 13.66 
Group 4: Canadian Programs 
(1996 - 2002) 0.87031408 0.75744659 75.7% 47.78 
Group 5: Worldwide Program (1992 
- 2000) -0.12691684 0.01610789 1.6% -41.65 
All Groups 0.61263598 0.37532284 37.5% 88.02 
 
Program Duration 
Program duration was calculated by first finding the number of days between a 
programs’ start and end date. The calculated number of days was then divided 
by 31, the approximate average number of days in a given month. Duration 
values represent the approximate number of months of a program’s tenure. 
Several programs are ongoing. For an exact list of program dates, see Table 6. 
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Table 99: Correlat ion Table: Program Duration and Total Number of Vehicles 
Retired 
Group Correlat ion Coeff icient 
Coeff icient of 
Determination % Slope 
Group 1: Worldwide 
Programs (2009 - 2010) 0.08778092 0.00770549 0.8% 6464.63 
Group 2: California 
Programs (1990 - 2010) 0.01174187 0.00013787 0.0% 5.66 
Group 3: U.S. State-Based 
Programs (1992 - 2010) 0.92343825 0.85273821 85.3% 1342.35 
Group 4: Canadian 
Programs (1996 - 2002) -0.09206049 0.00847513 0.8% -7.98 
Group 5: Worldwide 
Program (1992 - 2000) -0.06242563 0.00389696 0.4% -2500.39 
All Groups -0.13562891 0.01839520 1.8% -1008.05 
 
 
Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement 
The minimum vehicle age requirement for a vehicle to be eligible for a given 
program was not found for California’s Consumer Assistance Program, 




grams, and the California HEROS program based eligibility on other factors, and 
were thus excluded. 
 
Table 100: Correlation Table: Minimum Vehicle Age and Total Number of Vehicles Retired 
Group Correlat ion Coeff icient 
Coeff icient of 
Determination % Slope 
Group 1: Worldwide 
Programs (2009 - 2010) -0.25096514 0.06298350 6.3% -52750.42903 
Group 2: California 
Programs (1990 - 2010) -0.49639624 0.24640923 24.6% -1044.859935 
Group 3: U.S. State-Based 
Programs (1992 - 2010) -0.91356090 0.83459351 83.5% -13845.5 
Group 4: Canadian 
Programs (1996 - 2002) -0.90251464 0.81453267 81.5% -2796.721311 
Group 5: Worldwide 
Program (1992 - 2000) 0.23005221 0.05292402 5.3% 20204.77273 
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